From a Singapore Angle

What is the precise relevance to Singapore?--you might ask. I'm not sure about that at this point, except that (1) it follows up from this and this previous posts, and (2) one of the pieces is reprinted in the Straits Times...

From ST (Jan 24) Review, "A legal election does not always bring legitimacy", by a Ralf Dahrendorf:

It is vital to remember that elections alone do not guarantee legitimacy, even if they are seen to be free and fair...

First, turnout is crucial: who has voted and who has not. The second question is whether there remains any systematic, potentially violent opposition to the outcome...

Legitimacy by election is particularly problematic in countries with what might be called 'endemic minorities'.

In Canada, for example, it would be risky to overlook the special interests of Quebec. In Ukraine, the divergent interests of the country's west and east have to be recognised if legitimacy is to be established.

In Iraq, a technical majority in a wholly legal election is almost meaningless if the position of Sunni Muslims and Kurds is not explicitly recognised. The occupation powers are therefore right to be worried about an election in which massive abstention among Sunnis results in a large Shi'ite majority.

Which should be compared to this piece from Tech Central Station, "The Iraq Election and the Bogus Objections to It", by Stephen Schwartz:

But Western media and governments are also handicapped in dealing with Iraq by a peculiar double standard regarding the very status of the Iraqi Arab Sunnis as a formerly-ruling, and oppressive, minority. Twenty years ago, nobody would have listened to the argument that dismantling of the apartheid regime in South Africa and the holding of elections there should be blocked out of fairness to the white minority in that country. Few today listen to those who declare that fair elections and the forging of a new political system in Northern Ireland should be delayed out of concern for the feelings of the Protestant minority.

The Iraqi Arab Sunnis are no different from the white South Africans. (I pointed out this parallel in an interview with Netherlands Radio on January 14 [see here]). The Arab Sunnis have exploited and degraded the Shia majority in Iraq for a long, long time, reserving the wealth of the country for themselves. But why is the rule applied to the white South Africans not equally appropriate in Iraq?

The only explanation seems to be that the causes of Black South Africa and of the Northern Irish Catholics were considered leftist, and were therefore identified with opposition to U.S. and other government policies, while the cause of the Iraqi Shias is "contaminated" by association with the Bush administration.

There is another, similar precedent that deserves to be cited here. Six years ago, Serbian rule was overturned in Kosovo by NATO arms; but the Western left suddenly became more concerned about the fate of the usurping and violently oppressive Serbian minority in that territory than about the rights of the Albanian majority. Again, the difference between the Serbs and the white South Africans was simple: the former came to enjoy the sympathy of radical leftists enraged by U.S. unilateralism, while the latter were despised by the very same left. It should also be noted that in Kosovo and Iraq, in contrast with South Africa, the progressives of the United Nations opposed liberation. (The UN, interestingly enough, seems to know better than to try to interfere in Ulster.)

I do not believe the Iraqi Shias will exact bloody revenge from the Arab Sunnis after January 30 and the emergence of a new government, in which Shias will certainly form the majority. They have too much to lose, politically, socially, economically, and above all spiritually; a Shia rampage would alienate the Americans, who put Karbala in Shia hands after so many centuries.

I also do not believe the Arab Sunnis will support further terrorist aggression in Iraq after January 30. Rather, I predict they will follow one of two paths: either that of accommodation to the new administration, along the lines followed by white South Africans, or that of sporadic disruption as pursued by the Kosovo Serbs. In Kosovo, the foreign administration has accommodated the Serbs, contributing to discontent among the Albanians. We must hope this error is not repeated in Iraq...

Some critics of the Iraqi vote say it will lack legitimacy if a significant share of the Arab Sunnis -- that is, a large number among the 20 percent minority -- fail to cast ballots. That is absurd. At the end of the 20th century, the U.S. has had a voting turnout of only 48 percent; percentages of participation do not determine the legitimacy of elections. Iraqis of all religious groups will vote for the first time, and many will do so enthusiastically, with enormous appreciation of the U.S. and the coalition for making it possible. The outcome will encourage the march to popular sovereignty in Iran and the beginning of a transition to normality in Saudi Arabia...