Final thoughs on the exchange with Redrown
[Navigating this series: 1-3|4|5a|5b|Ref|Final]
Note: This will probably be my final post on this issue (Part 1-3, 4, 5a, 5b, R) for a while, though I may continue to post to the comments. Perhaps Olorin may have other things to add as well.
Redrown has a "Final Summarised Response to Critique" (here) which sheds much light on the context of his posts. The exchange has been illuminating and civil--or should I say, illuminating because civil (contrary to Rushdie's counsel). And above all, I salute his sense of duty: at one point, he reveals that he is PES A and has no intention of downgrading just for the sake of it. I'll salute that any day.
I suspect that at the end of the day, there is a fundamental difference of temperament between us that underlies our differences in opinion. On my remarks about his tripartite account of the types of personalities in NS, he says:
On a different note, I think the discussion can be furthered at a more refined level if we are able to make the analytical distinction between these:
I doubt that the present NS system will see its demise in any forseeable future, mostly because I do not forsee that our geo-strategic situation will allow us to get by with less military capabilities for some time to come. And I do not think that mercenaries are any solution at all, though a larger professional corp would probably be good. That said, a lot can be done and has been done in the area of substituting technology for brute manpower. In fact, I'll venture to say that if anything, this is one of the key strengths of the SAF. The reduction of NSF duty from 2 and a half to 2 years is a good step in that direction. And a lot definitely can be done to make the NSF experience a lot less unpleasant for so many Singaporeans--Redrown highlighted the use of NSF personnel as free labor for NDP, for example, and there's probably also more need for the officers and NCOs to do explain the rationale behind some of the things the SAF does during training, and more Auftragstaktik (see also this) in general (in this regard, the reports from Operation Flying Eagle are promising, and hopefully, they are indications of greater things to come).
Not that I am under any dellusions that the powers that be are monitoring our blogs.
UPDATE: Delighted to see that our exchange with Redrown has made Simon World's Feb 22 edition of "Asia by Blog".
UPDATE 2: ST (Feb 23) published an article, "Total defence lies in public participation", by Dr Azmi Hassan. The writer is associate professor with the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia. The original Malay version of the piece appeared in Berita Harian Malaysia (Feb 19). Coming from a cool-headed Malaysian perspective, it makes for an interesting read.
UPDATE 3 (28 Feb): Acid Flask of Caustic Soda has extended comments on the exchange, which are too long to summarize here.
[Navigating this series: 1-3|4|5a|5b|Ref|Final]
Note: This will probably be my final post on this issue (Part 1-3, 4, 5a, 5b, R) for a while, though I may continue to post to the comments. Perhaps Olorin may have other things to add as well.
Redrown has a "Final Summarised Response to Critique" (here) which sheds much light on the context of his posts. The exchange has been illuminating and civil--or should I say, illuminating because civil (contrary to Rushdie's counsel). And above all, I salute his sense of duty: at one point, he reveals that he is PES A and has no intention of downgrading just for the sake of it. I'll salute that any day.
I suspect that at the end of the day, there is a fundamental difference of temperament between us that underlies our differences in opinion. On my remarks about his tripartite account of the types of personalities in NS, he says:
I still maintain that such 'internal questioning' is still considered Type 2, unless one explicitly questioning the reasons during that time, which is tantamount to questioning a superior's command, which is not prudent as it may end one up in serious trouble (which I learnt).There's something to be said for this. In a way, Redrown was much more "idealistic" while I guess I am much more "conservative" (prudent from one point of view, kia see from another)--I have much less faith in bold attempts to make a difference and would rather go for long, slow incremental changes.
On a different note, I think the discussion can be furthered at a more refined level if we are able to make the analytical distinction between these:
1. The geo-strategic environment of SingaporeThey are related, but they are not the same thing. As I see it, we can only begin to have a proper appreciation of 2. if we have some grasp of 1. and 3 only if 2. Note that like Redrown, I do not think that 2. exhausts the field--there are also non military requirements for dealing with the geo-strategic enviroment (diplomacy, etc.). But I believe that at the end of the day, even taking into account all the non-military avenues, there will continue to be a military requirement as well. Once that is settled, we can begin to evaluate the NS system. But what is the metric for assessing the cost/benefit of the NS system? It can't be simply the personal costs to individual Singaporeans, or the social-economic costs in the abstract. Ideally, we should be taking about comparative costs vis-a-vis other alternatives that can fulfill our military defense requirements. Secondly, the comparison is not really that between conscription vs. some other system, but continuing with conscription vs. changing course. Once a policy is in place (for 30+ years too), it imposes additional costs on change that did not exist before. That said, the personal costs are not to be minimised (they add up to significant social cost). In fact, there is surely a lot of scope for making NS leaner and better, less friction, wastage, more bang for the time that individuals have to sacrifice from their life. But addressing those issues is not the same as weighing the cost/benefits of the NS system in toto.
2. The military defense requirements of Singapore
3. The role/value/costs of the NS system to Singapore
4. The costs of the NS to an individual Singaporean
I doubt that the present NS system will see its demise in any forseeable future, mostly because I do not forsee that our geo-strategic situation will allow us to get by with less military capabilities for some time to come. And I do not think that mercenaries are any solution at all, though a larger professional corp would probably be good. That said, a lot can be done and has been done in the area of substituting technology for brute manpower. In fact, I'll venture to say that if anything, this is one of the key strengths of the SAF. The reduction of NSF duty from 2 and a half to 2 years is a good step in that direction. And a lot definitely can be done to make the NSF experience a lot less unpleasant for so many Singaporeans--Redrown highlighted the use of NSF personnel as free labor for NDP, for example, and there's probably also more need for the officers and NCOs to do explain the rationale behind some of the things the SAF does during training, and more Auftragstaktik (see also this) in general (in this regard, the reports from Operation Flying Eagle are promising, and hopefully, they are indications of greater things to come).
Not that I am under any dellusions that the powers that be are monitoring our blogs.
UPDATE: Delighted to see that our exchange with Redrown has made Simon World's Feb 22 edition of "Asia by Blog".
UPDATE 2: ST (Feb 23) published an article, "Total defence lies in public participation", by Dr Azmi Hassan. The writer is associate professor with the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia. The original Malay version of the piece appeared in Berita Harian Malaysia (Feb 19). Coming from a cool-headed Malaysian perspective, it makes for an interesting read.
UPDATE 3 (28 Feb): Acid Flask of Caustic Soda has extended comments on the exchange, which are too long to summarize here.
[Navigating this series: 1-3|4|5a|5b|Ref|Final]
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