From a Singapore Angle

More news about the Malaysia-Indonesia face off. Thanks to EagleSpeak and Lzydate of Singapore Ink for linking the earlier post. Ok, on to more news--

First, some sabre rattling in the Indonesian Parliament; from The Jakarta Post (Mar 8), "Govt urged to get tough in territory dispute":

JAKARTA (Antara): Speaker of the House of Representatives (DPR) Agung Laksono urged on Monday the government to take stern action, including the use of military force if necessary, to solve a territorial dispute with Malaysia...

"The government should take stern action without hesitation, including military force if necessary," House Speaker Agung Laksono said. "We will support such moves as we believe the people will also support such a move." The Ambalat block was well inside Indonesian territory and undeniably part of Indonesia, he said...

Meanwhile, chairman of House' Commission I on political and security affairs Theo Sambuaga urged the government to recall its ambassador to Kuala Lumpur as an answer to Malaysia's claim on Ambalat Block.

"We also urge the government to continue building the lighthouse on Unarang Shoal in the disputed waters with full protection from the Indonesian Navy," Theo said.

There is a fairly illuminating interview with maritime defence analyst Mak Joon Nam of Singapore’s Institute of Southeast Asian Studies with the Radio Singapore International; via CNA (Mar 7), "Is joint development a possible solution to maritime dispute between M'sia and Indonesia?", by Yvonne Gomez:

Q: What message does each side send to the other by deploying defence forces to the disputed area?

MJN: Basically that’s what we call establishing a presence. If you don’t establish a presence in terms of sovereignty claims, it’s a de facto recognition of the other side’s claim of sovereignty. That’s why whenever somebody makes a claim and you dispute it, you have to send in a counter-claim, or else you send in a diplomatic note saying that you don’t recognize that claim. So presence is so very important in establishing your claim.

Q: Indonesia has said that it had the right to expel Malaysian warships in the disputed area. If tensions continue to escalate, what is the danger of a confrontation between forces from both countries to protect what each believes to be its territorial integrity?

MJN: I don’t think it’s a thing called 'territorial integrity'. If you look at the map, at the most you can claim that it’s part of their Exclusive Economic Zone because their territorial waters can only extend 12 nautical miles from the baseline at low tide, and that is about 200km out by anybody’s calculation. So it’s part of the Exclusive Economic Zone and [HC: add "even though"?] you have sovereign rights over the resources in your Exclusive Economic Zone you don’t have sovereignty over your Exclusive Economic Zone. So you have to make that distinction very, very clear.

So, as EagleSpeak point out--"it's all about oil"; I'll only add: the oil of nationalism is being poured over the fire of perceived economic interest. It doesn't help that the Indonesian Government and TNI may find itself having to do the extra bit to show that they're still strong and in control after the recent tsunami, and after the loss of Sipadan and Ligitan by Indonesia to Malaysia earlier--awarded by the ICJ to Malaysia in 2002. But I'll let Mr. Mak continue:

I think for these two countries to go to war over resources...well...given the history and background of Malaysia and Indonesia, I think that is fairly unlikely. In fact, when I was with MIMA (Malaysian Institute of Maritime Affairs) tensions at that time were building over Sipadan and Ligitan, and in point of fact, the navies of the two countries came together to work out what we called the Prevention of Incidences at Sea Agreement, which they actually signed and initialed two years ago. They know exactly what to do and there is this mechanism to allow them to exchange information. They have the communication channels established already. The bottomline is that I don’t think things will escalate beyond control.

That is somewhat reassuring, considering that, as Lzydata puts it, "'Konfrontasi 2' is no joke, even if all you’re doing is shooting your mouth off." It would be no laughing matter for us as well. Hopefully, Mr. Mak is right here.

Q: Speaking of politicians, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is currently on a visit to a province near the disputed area. What does his physical involvement in the issue say about seriousness with which Indonesia views this dispute?

MJN: I think you have to view this current dispute against the background of the loss of Sipadan and Ligitan by Indonesia to Malaysia. There was a lot of backlash and pressure built up from the elite. In fact they accused the then-President of selling out Indonesia. So the current president will have to be very careful about not losing territorial integrity, or be seen to be backing down on territorial integrity. The people in Indonesia, and also in Malaysia, don’t know the difference between Exclusive Economic Zone and territorial seas so I don’t blame them for it. But if you look at the background, there was a lot of pressure for Indonesia not to give up any more sea territories.

On possible solutions:

Q: Speaking of the agreement you mentioned earlier, Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi has called for talks to be held with Indonesia to resolve the dispute "to avoid untoward incidences". In maritime territorial disputes such as this, what is best way to reach a resolution?

MJN: It's very difficult because if you look at the claims, it depends on how you find your baseline and turning points, and which islands you use for another baseline. So this is a fairly gray area. This is really a deep water part of the sea, somewhere between 500m and 4km deep. So technology at that time was such that people could only explore and exploit up to maybe 500m or 1km. Current technology is such that people can exploit up to 2km, so this is why the area has now become so important, and the quality of oil there is apparently quite high according to Shell. How do you resolve the issue? It’s extremely difficult and most literature I’ve come across, in the end, argues for putting forth a joint development area. This is very much a bilateral issue and I don’t think Indonesia, after the experience of Sipadan and Ligitan, will want to go for arbitration again. Ultimately I think a joint development agreement could be worked out.

UPDATE: ST (Mar 8), "A little diplomacy can help calm troubled waters", by Graham Gerard Ong has this to add concerning the Indonesian Navy, which gives us important background information to the present tension:

Unlike the littoral states of Singapore and Malaysia, the Indonesian navy played a vital role in the formation of the country's national consciousness after the end of World War II - a consciousness not unrelated to Indonesia once being the locus of the Srivijaya and Majapahit maritime empires between the 7th and 16th centuries.

Despite possessing only wooden ships, a few landing craft and weapons left over by imperial Japan, Indonesia, soon after the proclamation of its independence from the Dutch, created the Agency of the People's Security Sea Service, the progenitor of the Republic of Indonesia Navy (renamed in 1970 as the Navy of the Indonesian Armed Forces).

As one report put it, one of the initial purposes of the Indonesian navy was to 'expand the spirit of the (independence) proclamation'.

Its role was then further embellished through its contribution in the independence war against the Dutch between 1945 and 1949.

Though the Indonesian military's traditional role of dwifungsi has been officially dismantled in the post-Suharto era, the dispatch of the three warships was a knee-jerk response to President Yudhoyono's statement about what his government believes to be its rights in the Sulawesi Sea.

Similar to the actions of the Indonesian army in the recent past, the navy's recent actions show that the military's socio-political role is still a hard habit to break....

...the warships in Sulawesi may indicate a similar bid for power by the military, against what it perceives as President Yudhoyono's softness in negotiating with Malaysia on both the illegal workers' issue as well as the oil and gas blocks dispute.

It may also indicate a struggle for power within the military, among its various services. Significantly, just days before the Indonesia-Malaysia summit last month, the Indonesian navy announced a massive fleet expansion plan over the next decade.

Its plans to add at least 302 warships to its inventory may also indicate a desire to tip the regional naval balance of power in Indonesia's favour.

UPDATE: Next post.