Mr. Wang on the scholarship system; angels and devils
I was still hoping to find time to look more closely at the scholarship issue, especially now that Sze Meng's research has been made available. But now with Mr. Wang's excellent and detailed posts out, let me simply point in that general direction, for now anyway. He has lots of things to say about why the civil service's scholarship system won't work today (as it used to) and promises more on how it might be improved.
update: The third installment of Mr. Wang's series on the scholarship system is out, with four "brillant ideas" for improvement (can't say that he doesn't write with flair). And unless the stuff in this post, they are real suggestions, i.e., the sort that actually can be implemented. From what I understand, however, some of them are already being done--e.g., postgrad scholarships after a period of service.
* * * * *
But let me play the devil's advocate here for a moment (so don't take me as totally serious--I don't actually think this will work, but still, an interesting thought experiment). This is not meant to be a real suggestion for improving the system!
A large part of Mr. Wang's critique focuses on the changing attitudes and backgrounds of the prospective and actual scholarship holders. The scholarship has become more of a trophy rather than something one would be grateful for, the scholarship holders are not inspired by high ideals, etc.
While I share the sense that this is not a good development, and would prefer the civil servants running my country to be inspired by high ideals, I am really wondering if an alternative "freakonomical" model might also hold promise. That is, rather than hope and pray for the public spirited to materialise, make institutional arrangements to channel the energies of the talented in pursuit of their own interests so that the outcome is the common advantage.
From this perspective, the disadvantage of the current system is not that the scholars are not public spirited, but that we still expect them to be. That is, rather than hope and pray that those who might govern us would be angels, and consequently be disappointed, be clear eyed that many of them will be devils. The only thing left--if it can be done at all--is to find ways to make sure that whatever they do, they end up devils that work for us (see also this).
Incidentally, this line of thinking is not new, it underlies the notion of "separation of powers" in the Federalist Papers #51 (my emphasis):
What is important is that even within this model, there will be people who are genuinely public spirited--these always existed. And it is even possible that they will stand out precisely because the system is not constructed to count on them. The point of the system is not to discourage them, but to make sure that the un-public spirited ones don't get to screw us ordinary folks over, which, by the way, is not that easy. But it is possible.
You might wonder: how is it that such a system would not discourage the genuinely public spirited? A lot is going to depend on the motivations of the public spirited. Do they, for instance, look to the system to affirm their public-spiritedness? Or do they really just want to serve the public? If the latter, the system is not an obstacle. If the former, then this freakonomical system will not be able to deliver: as far as the system is concerned, they could all well be selfish. But someone who looks to such external affirmation would best reconsider his own motivations: is it really a desire to serve the public, or a desire to be known as such and be given a pat one the back for being such by the system, so to speak? In other words, I suspect that the system will more than likely discourage those who think they are public spirited but are not necessarily so. This system can thus be said to possess the virtue of being brutally honest.
I'll say it again: I do not believe that the above will actually work (why? another much longer story altogether). But still, something to think about.
update: (July 10 0945 -0400) I've left some addition remarks in the comments section on the reasons why this above model is ultimately inadequate. | elsewhere: see also Elia Diodati's roundup on discussions on both sides of the causeway.
update: The third installment of Mr. Wang's series on the scholarship system is out, with four "brillant ideas" for improvement (can't say that he doesn't write with flair). And unless the stuff in this post, they are real suggestions, i.e., the sort that actually can be implemented. From what I understand, however, some of them are already being done--e.g., postgrad scholarships after a period of service.
* * * * *
But let me play the devil's advocate here for a moment (so don't take me as totally serious--I don't actually think this will work, but still, an interesting thought experiment). This is not meant to be a real suggestion for improving the system!
A large part of Mr. Wang's critique focuses on the changing attitudes and backgrounds of the prospective and actual scholarship holders. The scholarship has become more of a trophy rather than something one would be grateful for, the scholarship holders are not inspired by high ideals, etc.
While I share the sense that this is not a good development, and would prefer the civil servants running my country to be inspired by high ideals, I am really wondering if an alternative "freakonomical" model might also hold promise. That is, rather than hope and pray for the public spirited to materialise, make institutional arrangements to channel the energies of the talented in pursuit of their own interests so that the outcome is the common advantage.
From this perspective, the disadvantage of the current system is not that the scholars are not public spirited, but that we still expect them to be. That is, rather than hope and pray that those who might govern us would be angels, and consequently be disappointed, be clear eyed that many of them will be devils. The only thing left--if it can be done at all--is to find ways to make sure that whatever they do, they end up devils that work for us (see also this).
Incidentally, this line of thinking is not new, it underlies the notion of "separation of powers" in the Federalist Papers #51 (my emphasis):
If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.It is even in Immanual Kant--not Kant of the Categorical Imperative, but the realistic Kant of Perpetual Peace:
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State.
The problem of the institution of a State, however hard it may appear, would not be insoluble even for a race of devils, assuming only that they have intelligence, and it may be put as follows: ‘A multitude of rational beings all requiring laws in common for their own preservation, and yet of such a nature that each of them is inclined secretly to except himself from their sway, have to be put under order, and a constitution has to be established among them so that, although they may be antagonistic to one another in their private sentiments, they have yet to be so organised that, in their public relations, their conduct will have the same result as if they had no such bad sentiments.’Like I said, this line of thinking is hardly new; I am merely borrowing and applying it to a slightly more restricted domain.
What is important is that even within this model, there will be people who are genuinely public spirited--these always existed. And it is even possible that they will stand out precisely because the system is not constructed to count on them. The point of the system is not to discourage them, but to make sure that the un-public spirited ones don't get to screw us ordinary folks over, which, by the way, is not that easy. But it is possible.
You might wonder: how is it that such a system would not discourage the genuinely public spirited? A lot is going to depend on the motivations of the public spirited. Do they, for instance, look to the system to affirm their public-spiritedness? Or do they really just want to serve the public? If the latter, the system is not an obstacle. If the former, then this freakonomical system will not be able to deliver: as far as the system is concerned, they could all well be selfish. But someone who looks to such external affirmation would best reconsider his own motivations: is it really a desire to serve the public, or a desire to be known as such and be given a pat one the back for being such by the system, so to speak? In other words, I suspect that the system will more than likely discourage those who think they are public spirited but are not necessarily so. This system can thus be said to possess the virtue of being brutally honest.
I'll say it again: I do not believe that the above will actually work (why? another much longer story altogether). But still, something to think about.
update: (July 10 0945 -0400) I've left some addition remarks in the comments section on the reasons why this above model is ultimately inadequate. | elsewhere: see also Elia Diodati's roundup on discussions on both sides of the causeway.
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