On a confusion about "imposing one's belief on others"

Just read Lincoln Gu Yuanhao's letter to ST Forum (Feb 28), "Don't let people impose their beliefs", which is in reference to Jamie Lee's letter "Why are we so afraid of the 'R' words?" (ST, Feb 17).

Now I don't really have a considered view about whether or not the 'R' word (whether "religion" or "race") should be part of our public discourse. I emphasise public because unless I am completely mistaken about Singapore Law, the sanctions are not against religious discourse per se. The point, as I understand Singapore's religious harmony policies, is to keep religion out of politics, rather than to put a complete lid on religious speech per se. In other words, while peaceful preaching and proselytizing are not forbidden, inciting people to violence is. So in a way, Gu's letter is pretty much off base:

I am a Chinese free thinker. Therefore, I am always irritated when people try to convert me to their religion and impose their beliefs on me. It is all well and good that they can find something to believe in, but it does not mean they need to impose their beliefs on others.

I am sorry that he is irritated, but that's not something the law can and should do something about--unless we are willing to go the whole hog and curtail the freedom of religious people in preaching and proselytizing even when they do so in an entirely peaceful manner!

That, by the way, was and still pretty much is the position of Communist China. And of course, it remains a punishable offense for Christians to evangelise in many Muslim countries. But any country that claims to practice religious freedom must allow people of different faiths to preach, to proselytize--if such is called for by their religions--and likewise, it would have to allow individuals the freedom to join, or leave, or remain in some religion as they so choose, or for that matter, to not have a religion at all.

But there is a deeper confusion that is worth pointing out, as it is not an uncommon one--again,

It is all well and good that they can find something to believe in, but it does not mean they need to impose their beliefs on others.

I am interested in this phrase "impose...beliefs on...". What does the following sentence mean? Take two agents, A and B, and proposition P

(1) A imposes his belief that P on B

Let's assume that this is always a bad thing, that (1) describes something reprehensible. But now we need to see what would count as an instance of (1). [I've edited this paragraph so as to make the overall argument flow better.]

Presumably, (1) is a specific instance of a more general set of phenomena:

(2) A believes that P, B does not believe that P, A wants B to believe that P, A does X where X is some action undertaken with the aim of getting B to believe that P

Once we've broken it down this way, it should be obvious that, so described, (2) can be innocuous, in fact, entirely commonplace. I'll state just one example: two friends A and B are taking the same course in NUS. They believed that that final exam is on Wednesday. One of them came to the belief that it is in fact on Tuesday (he rechecked the schedule, say). Being a friend of B, he is concerned to make sure that B gets news of this. He calls B on the phone and tells him, viz., he undertakes an action with the aim of getting B to believe that the exam is on Tuesday instead of Wednesday. Completely innocuous and utterly commonplace.

Let's say that B is stubborn; he insists that the exam is on Wednesday. He might even exclaim to A: just because you believe that the exam is on Tuesday doesn't mean that you have a right to impose your belief on me. It's not hard to see that he's being hyperbolic. A wasn't imposing his belief on him. He called on the phone, spoke in his normal voice, etc. Now if A had came to B's place with an electric baton and threaten to hurt B unless the latter believes as he does, we would have a case for saying that A had been attempting to impose his belief on B.

The lesson: the construction (2) describes a case of imposing one's belief on others only given the relevant X--e.g., the threat or use of force, or some other sort of coercion. Given some other stuff in X--the entirely peaceable actions of talking, say, it would be entirely unjust to talk about imposing.

The funny thing is that Gu's own formulations is as ambiguous as (2):

No belief is offensive in itself, but it becomes so when one tries to override the original belief of another individual. By bringing this discussion into the open, we allow such 'offensive' action to take place.

So A believed that the exam is on Tuesday and "tried to override" the "original belief" of B, i.e., that the exam is on Wednesday, and this is offensive? Surely he can't mean that. The mere attempt to change a person's beliefs is not by itself offensive. It's all going to depend on how this "overriding" is done, what sorts of actions that A undertake. Otherwise, Gu must be incredibly easy to offend. ("I'm sorry sir, but you gave me $5 short for the taxi fare"..."stop trying to impose your beliefs on me!" "Huh?!")

The above is terribly simplified because normally, part of the usual and peaceable action we often undertake to get someone to believe in something is to show the person a reason--of the relevant kind--that he should do so. For example, the taxi driver points to his fare-meter and shows the passenger the money given to show that he's still $5 short, or in or earlier example, A directs B to the relevant website showing the (updated) exam schedule, etc. And often times, the reason or evidence is of such nature that the other person need not be irrational even if he rejects it. ("Guess what I heard from Jane about Peter and his new girlfriend...etc"..."Yes, but I don't trust Jane.") And the sorts of reasons and evidences that might be appealed to in getting another person believe in the truth of some religious doctrine are often of this nature--they are seldom knockdown reasons (otherwise, we won't be talking about "faith"). I'll have more on this later.

So much for that. This other bit caught my eye:

I was shocked to realise certain religions capitalised on the tsunami disaster to gather more converts. About a week after the disaster, en route from Yio Chu Kang MRT station to Nanyang Polytechnic, no fewer than three people were distributing a booklet detailing the association between God and the tsunami.

After I scanned it, I threw it away as I found it offensive to my own beliefs. They were also distributing to people who were obviously of other religious beliefs.

It used to be that it's the people with strong religious beliefs who are offended when their god is blasphemed against. But now I'm trying to understand what exactly is it that offended Mr. Gu, the self avowed free thinker.

First, a short detour. Some things in life are such that given the evidence, reasonable (or properly trained) people will tend to draw the same conclusions. But other things are not so. In those cases, entirely reasonable people acting in good faith (humanly speaking, that is) even when faced with the exact same set of evidence, might draw very different conclusions. Sometimes, these conclusions are not only different, they are contrary and opposed to each other. Religious and philosophical doctrines are often of this nature. Even without the complications of ignorance, perversity, rivalries for power, status or economic gain, people often come to fundamentally different conceptions of life, of value, of answers to "ultimate questions". The philosopher John Rawls calls this the "burdens of judgment" (see his Political Liberalism, p. 55). Incidentally, religion (and philosophy) is hardly the only area of life that is of this nature.

Given any two positions on the "ultimate questions", it is not difficult for one to be in some sense "offensive" from the perspective of the other. From the point of view of the pro-choice people, any ban on abortion (no matter how qualified), tramples on the rights of women to determine how and what they will to their own bodies. From the point of view of the pro-life people, abortion on demand is an affront to the sanctity of life. The issue for society is not: how would any one set of these views affect the subjective feelings of someone who does not hold to them? Offense is inevitable--unless the society is willing to simply ignore the burdens of judgment and impose by coercive means one uniform set of beliefs on all issues pertaining to "ultimate questions" (i.e., end of religious freedom). The issue is: what are the peaceable and legitimate means by which these views may be expressed, and by which adherents of these views may seek to have others come to share their views?

No one can determine for Mr. Gu what he would feel upon encountering the views about the "association between God and the tsunami" or any other set of views that are contrary to the ones he hold. But why should such feelings be the basis for condemning the entirely peaceable actions of religious people (of whatever faith) to persuade others of the truth of their views?

More to come...

...Continued (Feb 28): Let me be absolutely clear about one thing. My intention is not to pick on Mr. Gu. It's just that his letter as published by ST (I don't even know if ST published his letter in full) furnished a useful launch pad for discussing certain (in my opinion) commonly encountered confusions. As I said, I don't really have a considered opinion on Jamie Han's proposal in his letter of Feb 17. On the one hand, I sympathetize with the sentiment that ideally, there is no in principle reason why religion or race cannot be part of our public discourse. The best way to keep crazy and irresponsible ideas of religious or racial extremists from doing damage is not to put a lid on them, but to expose them to the light of day and allow them to be contested, refuted, argued over, etc., by the public at large. But that said, it is possible that the specific condition in Singapore (and the region) poses special difficulties that call for a more prudent approach. I am thus undecided.

Operation Flying Eagle (Part 3)

The third and final part to ST's "Operation Flying Eagle: The inside story of the SAF's tsunami relief deployment" is out, entitled, "Mission accomplished...and what the operation really accomplished" (Feb 27), by Felix Soh. (My posts on Parts 1 and 2 previously). Once again, skipping most of the previously known stuff, there remains some points worth highlighting.

The first part of the article brings us up to speed: the return to relative normalcy in Meulaboh--one sign being the coming of increased traffic, and even traffic jams. Three weeks after Operation Flying Eagle began, the SAF began its phasing out, handing over the reconstruction work to the NGOs. Next come some assessments.

First, the article points out though the SAF's contributions are easily dwarved by what the US military brought to the relief effort (but by no means completely puny, I would add), "the early timing of the Singapore assistance made a big difference"--

The timely arrival of SAF relief assistance was critical as the people in Meulaboh were running low on water, food and medicine. The SAF contingent was the first to reach the town.

But there's more:

It was not just a 'numbers and size' game. It was having the right calibre of men and employing the right kind of equipment, for example, the much-in-demand heavy-lift Chinooks, to deliver relief where the help was most critically needed, which made Singapore's effort effective and impactful.

This point was acknowledged by the Americans themselves. As the New York Times magazine said: 'Consider the example of Singapore, a tiny country with a small but professional military.

'While the little (American) Seahawks flying off the deck of the Abraham Lincoln carried modest loads, six giant Chinooks, provided by the Singapore Armed Forces with little fanfare, did a good deal of the heavy lifting.'

In a way it's slighly unfair to the Americans--obviously they deployed as quickly as they could with what they've got--and it's not their fault that they did not have many Chinooks in this part of the world. But they did have many other helicopters flying from the Carriers and other Navy vessels. Still, it is fortunate that Singapore does have the right equipment, and in a place where they could be of maximum effectiveness. But to continue, the article goes on to ask the important question. No, no, not exactly this one:

So, what were the ingredients that made Operation Flying Eagle a success?

But this one:

What was the SAF's 'takeaway' from the operation? What was the learning it acquired from the mission?

It's not that the first question is not worth asking, or the Operation Flying was not a success--it surely was. The answers to that question has always been clear. I am a little disappointed, however, with the article; because I think while it answered the first question amply, I see less by way of an answer to the second set of questions. But perhaps I should not be--the really interesting stuff will predictably also be the classified stuff. In general, it will be the happy stuff that makes the press...

In any case, the article identifies three broad points in explaining Op. Flying Eagle's success: First, the close institutional and personal relationship between the SAF and TNI. Second, the cultural sensitivity of the SAF personnel to the Indonesians and their way of life. Third, the quality of SAF's men, doctrines and equipment. (All have appear in one form or other on this blog before.) For the first--the close ties between the SAF and TNI, the following example tells whole volumes:

IN THE possession of the Republic of Singapore Navy is a special sea chart of the Meulaboh area in western Sumatra. It is special because it is hand-traced. The manually drawn chart, which was critical for navigation in the unfamiliar waters of Meulaboh, is a reflection of the close relationship developed over the years between the SAF and the Tentera Nasional Indonesia (TNI).

RSS Endurance commanding officer Lt-Col Li said: 'We had no suitable chart of the correct scale. Through our relationship with the TNI-AL (navy), we managed to obtain a chart of Meulaboh waters and this greatly helped in keeping the ship safe.'

When the second LST, RSS Persistence, arrived, he asked the Indonesian navy whether they had another chart to spare. There was none. 'Instead, the admiral's staff manually traced a copy of the chart for us,' he said.

Apart from the hard work that someone in the TNI-AL had to go through to get the chart hand traced, what is much more telling is the Indonesian's willingness to trust the SAF with a chart of this nature. This willingness--in my opinion--cannot be simply attributed to the fact that,

from their frequent interaction in bilateral meetings and visits. SAF commanders were familiar with the key Indonesian military personnel running the emergency relief work in Aceh.

I'm sure that paved the way somewhat; but at the end of the day, Indonesia does not fear Singapore. They do not feel threatened by the SAF, even though they probably recognize the SAF's technological superiority and so on, and even though as neighboring countries, we may irritate them at times. This underlying factor cannot be overlooked. It also suggests that the same level of trust may not be forthcoming if it had been another neighbor we were dealing with (I'll leave it at that). Needless to say, the sensitivity and sincerity displayed by the SAF helped

...the TNI officers were comfortable with the presence of the SAF officers. They were also impressed with the SAF's low profile and the sincerity of its assistance. An Indonesian intelligence source said: 'When SAF soldiers stepped on Indonesian soil, we never had a doubt that they were genuine and sincere in wanting to help.'

The Singaporeans never took the Indonesians for granted. Meulaboh task force commander Colonel Tan Chuan Jin commented: 'Every day, we re-calibrated our interaction with the Indonesian authorities and people. We were mindful of treating people with respect and dignity.'

For instance, it would make a dramatic media photo opportunity to have survivors running after food and bottled water thrown from a helicopter. But the SAF did not do this as it could be dangerous for people on the ground.

But my point is that all this cannot be detached from the fundamental reality. It is not that the SAF personnel are not sincere or genuinely considerate about Indonesian sensitivities; but that the perceptions have been helped along by ever present reality of the sheer unbalance between Singapore and Indonesia. The best intentions and sensitivity that a US marine, say, can have and display, however, would not have counted as much.

In any case, let's hope that the goodwill generated by the SAF personnel did not die with the end of Op. Flying Eagle:

The Indonesians are appreciative of Singapore's contributions and intentions. Political observer Muchyar Yara told The Sunday Times: 'It was not just the machinery and technology that the SAF brought with them to Aceh. It was their men in the frontline. 'They had cultural acumen. They spoke the language and knew how to relate to the Acehnese, which some of the other foreign troops found a lot harder.' He added: 'There is a perception in some pockets in Indonesia that Singapore is a rich state that looks after only its own interests. But the crisis in Aceh showed that it was no fair-weather friend of Indonesia's.'

On the third point--the quaility of the SAF, men, machine, doctrine, it's almost as if ST has gotten wind of Singapore Ink's charge at the "lack of jointness", as the article went out of its way to paint up jointness between the services:

Teamwork was certainly a key factor. It was a joint operation involving all the services - land, sea and air. While some foreign armed forces are riven with unproductive rivalry and petty jealousies among their services, the SAF is a paragon of so-called 'jointness'.

Mr Teo said: 'Regulars, NSmen, operationally ready NSmen and volunteers were all involved and were able to work as a team. This shows the close integration between army, navy and air force. The relief efforts required combined capabilities.'

Well, let's be honest here. Inter-service rivalry is not as big a deal in the SAF mostly because--everything else aside--it is a very young military we are talking about here. The services never had the long traditions and histories that tend to generate special loyalties within each service, and therewith, inter-service rivalry. Furthermore, the SAF had the advantage of being started from scratch with the help of the very best--the Israelis; as opposed having evolved over decades and centuries from pre-modern precusors complete with stashes of captured colors from some bygone age. In fact, the Israelis themselves said that they managed to with the SAF even things they had wanted to, but somehow failed to do back home:

In discussions conducted by the chief of staff, Yitzhak Rabin, with the participation of the deputy chief of staff and head of the Operations Branch, Ezer Weizmann, it was decided to make Major General Rehavam Ze'evi, who was then deputy head of the Operations Branch, responsible for building the Singaporean army. Ze'evi (nicknamed "Gandhi" ) paid a secret visit to Singapore and the preparatory work began on his return. "Gandhi said he wanted to create an ideal army for Singapore, something we hadn't built here," Carmel says. "Instead of setting up a Defense Ministry and a General Staff, Gandhi suggested an integrated organization, a more economical structure. So there wouldn't be too many generals and too few soldiers." (from here)

Incidentally, the youth of the SAF is a big reason why it can undertake such rapid transformations to becoming a "3G" armed forces--there just isn't as much hidebound tradition to overcome. But back to jointness--while I think the baseline conditions advantage the SAF as far as the integration of the services is concerned, how that intergration actually translates into an effectively joint armed forces in operations is another matter altogether. All indications are that the SAF aquitted itself favorably in Op Flying Eagle, but I'm sure there's lots more that can be done.

I've already touched on SAF personnel "thinking out of the box" in my posts on the first two installments, but Defence Minister Teo Chee Hean mentioned it this time as well:

"We do have a versatile set of capabilities and were able to assemble them together for the mission. Our people are professional and are trained in a flexible way when faced with circumstances never experienced before. They found the best way, for example, to get ashore, to bring equipment in, to fly helicopters to places unknown, to locate places to land. The field engineers had to find sea landing sites as well as clear and create new landing sites for heavy helicopters. These required a lot of flexibility and sound initiative."

He will go on to say that Op Flying Eagle showed the operational readiness of the SAF, and vindicated its arduous, intensive training tempo and regime. Many units had experience in deploying overseas for exercises, which helped. And the commanders exhibited good leadership and initiative:

[Said BG Goh Kee Nguan, contingent HQ commander] "In an operation that's so spread out and the situation on the ground so dynamic, we must have commanders who can work on their own."

And there's even a PR pay off as well:

The success of Singapore's biggest-ever tsunami deployment has boosted the public's confidence in the SAF more than any of its testosterone-packed advertisements in the media...

[CDF LTG Ng Yat Chung said:] "The operation has improved the confidence of Singaporeans in the SAF and their pride in the SAF. It is an eye-opener for Singaporeans of what the SAF could do after years of training and systematic development of our capability."...

In turn, the mission has boosted the confidence of the SAF's rank-and-file in their organisation. For them, the success of the mission is a ringing endorsement of the SAF's direction, policies and equipment. In other words, the 'system' works.

Hopefully; and again, no reason to rest on one's laurels here. The transformation of the SAF into a 3G force is still ongoing. In mounting Operation Flying Eagle, the SAF not only helped a friend in need, it seized a golden opportuntiy to put its men, machines, doctrine, and much else to the test. Let's hope that the lessons learned--the real lessons, the ones that are classified--will go a long way in making SAF better and more effective in defending Singapore in the years to come.

UPDATE: Singapore Ink's comments on the article are out (Lzydata beat me to it again). As expected, the jointness thing came up:

Heh, it's funny that two weeks ago it was this very "jointness" in the SAF I questioned...While there may not be much “unproductive rivalry and petty jealousies" among our services, if one simply remembers the first part of this series of reports, it’s clear that SAF is not yet a "paragon of… 'jointness'."

He also takes issue with the article's citation of Eliot Cohen (which I didn't bother with, since I've not read that book before), but you can read the Singapore Ink post for yourself.

Koei to develop massive multiplayer game in Singapore

Reading the below article brought back a whole flood of childhood memories--playing Koei's Romance of the Three Kingdoms versions 1, 2, 3, 4...I lost count after that. When in Berkeley, I once heard a story about how an instructor of early Chinese history had to face down ROTK fanatics in class who disputed the professor on some obscure point about late Han history. Apocryphal, I'm sure, but suggestive. From the Electric New Paper (Feb 27):, "Game giant looks to Singapore", by Oo Gin Lee:

JAPAN'S computer game giant wants Singaporeans to be part of its online experience. Koei Entertainment is moving big into massively multiplayer online games (MMOG), and Singapore is going to be an important part of it.

Koei, one of the world's leading computer games creators, is developing its most ambitious product yet - a massively multiplayer online game (MMOG) based on the Romance Of The Three Kingdoms saga which it aims to take the world by storm. And the entire game will be developed right out of Koei's local games studio at China Square.

For Singapore, developing a major computer game of this scale is a historic first...

(Read the rest). Wait, this other bit caught my eye:

The game will also be linked to handphones, allowing players to continue their adventures at home or while on the move.

This is not good...maybe, just maybe, it's time for NUS to invest in some wi-fi jamming for the lecture halls.

Pirates!

Not this though.

I blogged very recently on Austin Bay comment about terrorism in Southeast Asia (see also the extensive discussions on Belmontclub on which I found the Bay article). He mentioned that attacks in the sea lanes is a real possibility to be guarded against--which brings to mind the issue of piracy in the region. Serendipitously, Eaglespeak just posted an excellent extended analysis of the piracy situation.

I shan't summarize Eaglespeak's post here, but he provided a number of useful links: there is a three parter by one Eric Khoo last year in Asia Times (Part 1, "Southeast Asia's modern-day pirates" (Oct 19, 2004); Part 2, "Tides of terror lap Southeast Asia" (Oct 20, 2004); Part 3, "Strategies for maritime security" (Oct 21, 2004), all of which makes for an interesting read. Just two highlights. First, from Part 2, the potential link between terrorism and piracy:

Preliminary investigations by US intelligence agencies have yielded no direct evidence linking piracy to terrorism. Yet the possibility of an alliance between piracy and terrorism cannot be ruled out. Piracy provides lucrative means of raising funds with which to purchase weapons for terrorists. In turn, terrorist groups can provide the expertise with which pirates may better avoid capture or arrest by lawful authorities. Such a possible collaborative relationship brings vital benefits to either party. If circumstances allow, terrorist bases and safe havens may even provide the necessary protection for pirates to hide their operations and activities.

With the intense crackdown on terrorist cells on land, terrorist groups are likely to shift their operations to sea out of necessity and to avoid attention. Recent discoveries show that sophisticated groups such as al-Qaeda already have placed their sights on attacking maritime targets: terrorist suspect Babar Ahmad, apprehended on August 4 in London, had plans detailing vulnerabilities in US naval fleets. State governments in Southeast Asia have long recognized this fact and have set up cooperative efforts in coordinating maritime patrols, in particular along the Malacca Strait.

The tsunami of Dec 26, in all likelihood, put a damper on the piracy, and by implication, any tie up with terrorist organisation. But presumably, it wasn't as if the problem was solved in some definitive sense.

Second, from the conclusion to the series:

It is not enough to limit maritime security to only brown-water security patrols. The guarding of sea straits by maritime security forces is merely the first step in the war against piracy and maritime terrorism. The recent alliance in maritime cooperation among Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia may cause pirates to lie low for the moment, but vigilance must be maintained over long periods of inactivity. Maritime security matters have a more international hue when compared with land-based security affairs. As such, the impact and application of naval activity even outside Southeast Asia are of interest. For a start, the possibility of extending the range of patrol area covered by Singapore could be seriously considered.

Lots of politics to over come there, for that last point.

UPDATE: Eaglespeak has another post on the topic area up--I missed it earlier. ADDITIONAL THOUGHT: Eaglespeak is right that given the importance of the Malacca Straits, even if terrorists/pirates managed to highjack a tanker and cause a collision, say, the resulting closure would be relatively short liven.

But from the Singapore point of view, any such disruption to trade can be--while not deadly--a significant blow to the general climate of confidence if it happens in our vicinity. As Austin Bay's article points out (posted earlier here), terrorists target Singapore for the "demonstrative effect"--"if al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah could get it done here, a terror strike, they can get it done anywhere in the region. That is the message." So even if the closure is limited or quickly overcome, I worry about the psychological impact--considering our status as an open ally in the GWOT. It will likely rally people to the cause of Al-Qaeda's surrogates in the region. That said, he's right that if they can hit a US warship, that would be major jackpot.

UPDATE: From ST (Feb 28), "Armed Navy escorts for suspect ships--Uniformed security teams to escort vessels entering, leaving port within S'pore waters", by Goh Chin Lian:

SINGAPORE'S anti-terrorist battle will take to the seas next month with the deployment of armed security teams by the Republic of Singapore Navy on board some merchant ships.

The uniformed security teams will escort vessels entering or leaving the port, but only within Singapore waters.

Selected merchant ships, including cruise liners, would be identified for escort. The ship's previous ports of call, the cargo on board and other shipping data, would be looked at for hints of possible threats.

Up to eight Navy personnel could board ships each time, among them a seaman, an engineering specialist and a radio operator, who would know how to take control of the ship in an emergency.

They will don bullet-proof vests and carry weapons such as carbines and pistols, but they will not have powers of arrest, which will rest with the Police Coast Guard officers accompanying them.

Firefox update out, but there is a bug

From Ars Technica, version 1.0.1 of Firefox is out, fixing a curious previously known bug:

That particular bug results from Firefox's implement of the IDN specification which allows the use of non-English characters in URL names. So substituting the "a" in amazon.com with а will result in Firefox displaying "аmazon.com" in the address bar, while directing users to an entirely different site. The IDN issue is not unique to Firefox, as it also affects Opera, Safari, and OmniWeb — but not Internet Explorer.

Unfortunately 1.0.1 comes with a bug of its own:

Based on the reactions of some early adopters, 1.0.1 could have used a little more quality assurance testing before its release. The primary problem that is affecting multiple users is Firefox 1.0.1 crashing when a user types a query into a search bar, a rather irritating bug that should have been caught. It seems to affect most those people who installed 1.0.1 on top of 1.0. One solution is uninstalling 1.0 and then installing 1.0.1...

Now the brief review did go on to note that "according to Bugzilla, that bug has since been fixed"; but I couldn't quite get a fix on the last part. I'm holding off until the situation becomes clearer.

Straits Times and the Blogs

As only to be expected, Straits Times' announcement about paid access to ST Interactive sparked a reaction from Singapore's Blogosphere (or that corner of the Blogosphere in Singapore, depending on how you see it). I've already cited the responses from Singapore Ink and IZ Reloaded in the previous post. In fact, a technorati search for "Straits Times subscription" turned up some 116 posts as of 4 pm Feb 25 EST).

Mr Brown, apart from being the first to put the news out online (by posting ST's email to the registered users) also has a column in TODAY (Feb 25) in which he details the many things that can be read online for free. He also left an interesting comment on Singapore Ink's second post the long and short of which is nicely summed up in his parting rhetorical question:

...who says blogs cannot potentially cover Singapore news as well as the Straits Times?

There's a lot to be said for this sentiment. The fact is, there is a lot of stuff out there in the public domain that is not often reported in ST. Secondly, individual blogs are doing a great job covering various aspects of life in Singapore, stuff that hardly ever makes the press. Thirdly, let's not "forget alternative sources of Singapore news" (mainstream), such as "Channelnewsasia, Yahoo, and TODAY". So all in all, there's something very right about the claim that ST is not completely indispensable.

But let's be realistic here. ST obviously has no monopoly over what counts as a newsworthy item of Singapore life, and there is a lot of space that can be fruitfully covered by blogs. But I wouldn’t for a moment imagine that there aren’t large and significant areas of life in Singapore and the region that blogs will be able to do much (at this stage) without something like a ST--with all its reporters, financial resources, etc.

I mentioned earlier the example of SAF's relief effort in Meulaboh--but even that is only the tip of the iceberg as far as Singapore’s relief efforts are concerned. I don’t think the picture in Meulaboh, Banda Aceh, Medan, Phuket–not to mention the Maldives, etc., would be as clear if we only had MINDEF/MFA press releases and the blogs. In fact, not even CNA and TODAY, which run similar stories, provided as much details-–details that are not all that easy to come by if you are not there yourself as a SAF, SCDF or NGO personnel. And the international news agencies and wire services are not really helpful here--we are too small for them to care. And all the above stands even though we now have excellent blogs such as Terse and at Large giving us such exquisite and up close reportage of the situation in Meulaboh. But we did not have a blogger on the RSS Endurance, or with the Guardsmen manning the logistics HQ in Medan, or the field hospitals, or with the Chinook crew plying the route to and from Banda Aceh, or what about the folks with the SCDF in Thailand, or the various medical teams in Sri Lanka. (If you are involved in these or other related operations, here's a challenge: start your own blog; or if you know of people blogging first hand about these items, please, please drop me a line.)

As I see it, the blogs can do a good job--potentially a much much better job than ST--in three regards. (1) Very specialized and up close reportage (e.g., Terse and at Large). But at the end of the day, the blogs are not quite at the level of ST’s overall news collecting ability for certain kinds of events, and I doubt that we ever will completely replace something like a ST in this regard. More importantly, (2) punditry, commentary, pointing out the biases, etc. (e.g., funding for Biomed startups, anyone? Or how about this?) In this regard, I think the blogs collectively bury the ST editorials and reviews (or relegate it to be at best one voice among many). A crowd is never wise, but there are inevitably many individuals who knows some few things very well in a crowd--and who knows those few things to a much higher degree than a ST editor can ever hope to be. That's why I say that collectively, the blogs will bury ST. And related but distinct from the previous, (3) functioning as a channel for lively critical discussions on the issues of the day (think "Jamie Han", and multiply that by many times). In this regard, the blogs will potentially render ST Forum Page redundant. My own prediction is that, barring any drastic curb of internet freedom, (2) and (3) will form important aspects of a wider civic discourse in Singapore for years to come, if such is not already happening.

The relationship between ST (and the other press houses) and the blogs is thus, at it's very best, complementary. They are not exactly substitutes for each other. It is in light of these considerations that ST's decision to go for paid subscription is, in a sense, bad (but not fatal) news for bloggers.

UPDATE: AcidFlask of Caustic Soda agrees and has this to add:

...the loosely-connected diversity of opinion available on blogs are the biggest advantage of blog media, and also its biggest disadvantage. the paradox of quality analysis and opinions without publicity. blogrolls help to some extent, but really aid those who are in the loop already, with the possible exceptions of blogrolls by celebrated bloggers.

The one thing, I gather, that really gets him (understatement), would be the ST editors:

one thing in particular that i now feel strongly about are the morons who work the op/eds desk in the straits times. many of the columnists are tepid at best, if not downright wrong. (take shianux's case study of one of andy ho's pieces, for example.) and the high noise-to-signal ratio of so many of the published submissions to the forum is just ridiculous. one may bitch about how the standard is already way higher than the fora in most other newspapers (which are mostly inane responses to provocative articles), but given the st forum's unique role as a formal hitching post for singaporean society, such aggressive editorial policy in trimming most of the signal is really reprehensible. what, do we need to bitch to lky about not being able to publish in the forum in order for our submissions to show up?

Well, as Wannabe Lawyer puts it, sometimes complaining actually works.

UPDATE 2: I think I'm being browned...(where are my manners) Welcome, dear reader, if you've just wandered here from Mr Brown's post about Blogs vs. Journalism (and if you did not, he has a link to a very funny segment of the Daily Show about the role of blogs). But if you are looking for a more analytical discussion on the potential power of blogs, one that makes use of such imposing ("cheem") technical terms as "the long tail" and "high trust environment", you'd have to see this instead.

UPDATE 3: A reader reminded me in the comments about The Singapore Commentator's take on the issue--he links to an interesting write-up on the Wall Street Journal, which has been charging its online subscribers for some time now. While the readership continues to be high (2.1 million for the dead tree version, 684,000 for the online version), the WSJ is risking a slide into irrelevance:

Since most people refuse to pay for WSJ stories, most bloggers are reluctant to link to them. It also has an impact on anyone who uses the web for research -- and there are a lot of us. As importantly, the next generation of readers is growing up by accessing news over the internet, and one place they are not surfing to is WSJ.com. With their habits being formed now, there is little chance the Journal will become part of their lives, either now or in the future.

The question is whether ST will end up this way (i.e., irrelevant). Here, I'm not so sure, at least for the short to medium run. For good or for evil, ST is the premier English paper in Singapore. If you are American and can't/don't get WSJ.com, there's still a host of other decent presses available online. But until TODAY becomes as extensive in its coverage (and I am talking about local and regional stuff here), ST will continue to exert influence in Singapore by its near monopolistic status.

UPDATE 4: This is not going to die fast--more comments from Singapore Ink. I'm beginning to wonder if there are readers of ST who will (like myself) eventually switch to a online-only subscription, especially if ST is willing to put everything (or just about) on the print edition online as well?

UPDATE 5: Next post on this matter is here.

Straits Times Interactive to begin charging for access

The last straw? From ST (Feb 24):

SINGAPORE'S most-read English language news website, The Straits Times Interactive (STI), will no longer be afree-access one. ST website to charge for access from Mar 15

Come March 15, access to the 10-year-old online version of The Straits Times will be by subscription only. It will be only the second internet news site in Singapore to do this after The Business Times.

Three subscription plans will be available: Readers can choose to pay $15 a month, $72 for six months or $120 for a year.

On hindsight, it's only a matter of time. Look at what the Old Grey Lady is facing:

The New York Times, like all print publications, faces a quandary. A majority of the paper's readership now views the paper online, but the company still derives 90% of its revenues from newspapering. "The business model that seems to justify the expense of producing quality journalism is the one that isn't growing, and the one that is growing -- the Internet -- isn't producing enough revenue to produce journalism of the same quality," says John Battelle, a co-founder of Wired and other magazines and Web sites.

From Businessweekonline (Jan 17).

UPDATE: Singapore Ink spells out some potentially serious implications for bloggers:

Blogging on articles in the ST would be much less convenient when I have to type out extracts from the print edition & point readers to the day & page the article is on so that if they have print editions they can look at it. We will all also have to be careful about succumbing to the temptation of extracting too much for archival purposes, which could invite a letter from the ST’s lawyers...What to do? Maybe we should blog on Today articles more, even though they have much less content than the ST on any given day. For world news articles I could point to the wire agencies’ copy, even though those would be slightly different from the ST’s version. As enthusiastic as we are about the issues we blog on, as bloggers, we don’t have the time nor the financial backing to go chase down stories by ourselves. (Except for occasions like the Kent Ridge Ministerial Forum. I’m also thinking political rallies for the next general election.)

On the whole, our access to international news should not be affected. In fact, I seldom bother with ST since I can get the same (and better too) from NYT, IHT, WaPo, BBC, the wires, etc. But it's local and to some extent, regional news that will most likely be affected. (Think of the international (non)coverage of Singapore's tsunami relief operations in Meulaboh.) As for fears of copyright infringement, bloggers should be safe as long as we stay within the bounds of "fair use". One thing that is definitely true for me, however, is this:

I think folks now overseas, without ready access to the ST print edition, would not think $10 a month (the one-year subscription) too steep.

Actually, I think I'll continue with the subscription even after returning. I just don't want to deal with dead tree newsprint again, if I have a choice.

UPDATE 2: IZ Reloaded has 6 excellent pieces of free advice for ST, which will actually make it much more blog friendly...and even, shall we say, blog like. Just look at the following:

4) Maybe you do not know this, but bloggers can be quite handy friends to have. We bloggers quote news everywhere. We link to your news on our blogs. By restricting your online news to only those who pay, you lose something much more- online exposure. And you should know by now that news spread in blogosphere faster and wider than anything that has ever existed so far.

5) Include trackbacks in your online news. Yes, trackbacks are standard in blogs where we list down other blogs that are referencing our stories. You can use trackbacks for your online edition too. It would be a good way to check on who is using your news for their blogs and also a good way to judge which news are hot and which aren't.

6) Or you can include a Technorati search like they used in BoingBoing (look for the 'blog comments link' under each story). The Technorati Cosmos search works by listing all the blogs or websites that are using your link.

Not sure if ST will take this advice though, even if SPH reads it. But we can hope.

UPDATE 3 (By Olorin, originally in the comments)

Just thought you guys might want to take note of the local statutes. The following is taken from Copyright Act, Chapter 63, Sections 110 and 111. (I usually deal with Chapter 295, heh; but have been looking more at Chapter 63 since the US-Singapore FT Agreement was signed). From http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/:

Fair dealing for purpose of criticism or review

110. A fair dealing with an audio-visual item shall not constitute an infringement of the copyright in the item or in any work or other audio-visual item included in the item if it is for the purpose of criticism or review, whether of the first-mentioned audio-visual item, another audio-visual item or a work, and a sufficient acknowledgment of the first-mentioned audio-visual item is made.

Fair dealing for purpose of reporting news

111. A fair dealing with an audio-visual item shall not constitute an infringement of the copyright in the item or in any work or other audio-visual item included in the item if —

(a) it is for the purpose of, or is associated with, the reporting of news in a newspaper, magazine or similar periodical and a sufficient acknowledgment of the first-mentioned audio- visual item is made; or

(b) it is for the purpose of, or is associated with, the reporting of news by means of broadcasting or a cable programme service, by any other means of communication to the public, or in a cinematograph film.

Technically, if we are blogging, and use pictures or text related to the reporting of news, this would be use "associated with the reporting of news in a newspaper... similar periodical" (which I would think reasonably includes the internet edition of the Straits Times or any other news publication); and any comments we subsequently made will be covered by Section 110. [Of course, just because your comments qualify for exemption under copyright, doesn't mean you are exempt from libel suits! ] The quoting of news has long been considered fair use, and I do not think the US-Sing FTA has changed that.

Of course, if we start archiving ST material, then started charging people for access to these materials, then, Fair Use does not cover this.

Basically, scanning through some of the other articles where the word news pops up more or less confirms the view that news material is not considered copyrighted. [I don't mean things published in newspapers, I means news material]

I'd be interested to hear from any lawyers who would like to clarify or confirm the above though.

UPDATE: the next post on this matter is here.

Austin Bay on Terrorism in Southeast Asia

One of my favorite military writers Austin Bay--"author and syndicated columnist. Soldier, developmental aid advocate, war game designer, lecturer, and radio commentator" (in fact, you can link to his blog from my blogroll, under "Blogosphere") once wrote a piece for the Weekly Standard in 2003, "Dire Straits--The war on terror's Singapore front" that was recently discussed on Belmont Club. Some highlights and comments.

On the possibility of a "super Cole" attack on a super carrier transiting in Singapore:

AN AMERICAN OFFICER familiar with U.S. Navy security concerns in southeast Asia first tipped me to the aircraft carrier scenario. "Singapore's a logical choice for a 'super Cole' operation, or something similar," he said. That was October 2001. We sat in a CENTCOM office, a world map tacked to the wall (U.S. Central Command is responsible for our security interests from the Horn of Africa into Central Asia). "The Straits of Malacca are a chokepoint. The U.S. has log[istics] support on Singapore, to an extent replacing what we lost when we moved out of Subic [Bay, Philippines]. It's a nice place, First World in the Third World. Even if it wasn't a U.S. ally, Islamists don't like the island. It's Chinese--that's what the radicals say. They don't like it. Not because it isn't Muslim, but because it's a wealthy Chinese island dumped between two predominantly Muslim nations, Malaysia and Indonesia." [HC: now that, is a succinct summary of our geo-strategic situation in the 21st century.]

The officer and I explored several "ship assault" scenarios, including a tanker scuttled in the straits (this was a year before al Qaeda attacked a French tanker off Yemen). Our Malacca incident had the plot of a novel, with Indonesian or Malaysian pirates assisting al Qaeda operatives. The broken tanker spills a million barrels of crude, creating an eco-disaster, Exxon goo lapping pristine south sea beaches. The attack has iconic qualities, underlining Western and Japanese reliance on Mideast oil, producing the sort of propaganda bonanza a terrorist zealot literally dies for.

Then I said, "Sink a super carrier? The armor? U.S. Navy damage control? And we're watching for these guys." "Yeah," he replied. "But after September 11, the far out's too real..."

According to this next informant, the war is not new in this corner of the world, not by a long shot.

A new kind of war? Maybe, but for Mr. Chang it's not so new. His real name isn't Chang--not even close. Getting cops and counterterror intelligence officers to talk exacts a price, and that price is strict anonymity. I can say Chang has worked with a sophisticated group of intelligence officers and cops, drawing on assets from Malaysia, the United States, and Singapore's Internal Security Department (ISD). Their common foe is Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), al Qaeda's branch operation in Southeast Asia, headed by radical Indonesian cleric Abu Bakar Bashir.

Chang taps the map I've drawn, a black wriggle indicating strait and channel. "JI members discussed this attack, but they discuss much. They talk. But planned it to the point of carrying it out?" He shrugs.

I mention having heard that JI has reconned the approaches to Changi. That would suggest JI's naval operation has moved from talk to active consideration.

"Then you go find open sources who can confirm chatter," Chang says. "What I am trying to say to you, from my experience, is that American vessels and foreign embassies are not necessarily their only targets, Colonel."

Colonel. A careful investigator, he'd been to my website and elsewhere. I tell him I'm just a reservist.

"Yes," Chang smiles. "Yes, Mr. Bay." He amuses himself.

"But you agree a U.S. Navy ship is a prime target. Big headlines?"

"There are other attractive targets," he says, "from their [JI's] perspective. Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia--this region's been with this longer than you. We've been targets longer than you. I don't say this to insult. . . . America has joined our war."

JI's game plan:

[E]vidence gathered by Singapore's ISD over the past five years also makes Chang's point: Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia lie first and foremost in JI's geo-strategic kill zone. JI has large plans for the whole of Southeast Asia, plans dating from well before 9/11. Drawing on cadres schooled in past radical political movements that used Islam as both a wedge issue and a rallying cause, JI seeks to establish a grand "Islamic state" stretching from southern Thailand through Malaysia, the Philippine and Indonesian archipelagoes, and Australia. Indeed, JI produced a "green map" where the reach of sharia, as interpreted by JI leadership, extends into the Australian continent and New Guinea. Fanciful? Megalomaniacal? After 9/11 only the willfully blind can dismiss the motivating power of such an imperial eschatology.

Chang shows me a copy of JI's dreamland, pulling the map from his brown notebook and placing it on the counter. It's our second meeting. Chang orders a latte as I study the map. Borneo, Java, Thailand's Krak peninsula, the whole of the Philippines, western and northern Australia shaded in this photocopy. "They believe it," he says.

On why Singapore is such a favored target:

"JI chooses [terror operations] in Singapore for the demonstrative effect," says K. Kesavapany, director of Singapore's Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. We are in his chauffeured car, driving down Napier Road, a toney, tree-shaded boulevard where the U.S., British, and Australian embassies line up like well-fenced bunkers. All three, as well as the Israeli embassy, had made JI's target list. "We in Singapore have our guard up, so if al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah could get it done here, a terror strike, they can get it done anywhere in the region. That is the message." We pass a bus stop across from the U.S. embassy, the spot where a JI recon team videotaped the approaches to the American compound.

"We're an island World Trade Center," Kesavapany adds, as his driver turns the corner to drop me off at my hotel.

On Indonesia's lukewarmness (Singapore Government: we can neither confirm nor deny any such thing) to the terror threat before the Bali bombing:

The Bali bombing killed almost 200 people and injured another 300. It also demonstrated that al Qaeda was still probing Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia.

"What kind of counterterror cooperation exists with Indonesia since Bali?" I ask Chang, when I see him again.

"Since Bali the Indonesian police have been able to act more readily. Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore--the police cooperate closely."

"But until the Bali mess, the Indonesian government was publicly denying the threat of radical Islamists in Indonesia?" I prod.

Chang doesn't reply.

On the incident at Yishun MRT, and the US taking credit for what Singapore did:

Subways are another choice target. Singapore beefed up its counterterror unit after the 1995 Aum Shin Rikyo sarin nerve gas attack in Tokyo. A December 2000 terror attack on the Manila metro sent shock waves through the region. Indonesian Islamic militants were implicated in that attack. Filipino and other intelligence services had already developed dossiers linking JI to the Philippines' Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Jihadis trained with the MILF in the southern Philippines until the Philippine military began overrunning the camps in 2000 and 2001.

But for the clinching evidence putting JI in al Qaeda's bosom, check out the reconnaissance video of Singapore's Yishun metro station, which can be downloaded from the Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs website. Yishun is a subway stop near Sembawang, where U.S. naval facilities are located. The narrator of the video analyzes the arrival of the connecting bus outside the station and discusses the comings and goings of U.S. military personnel. One sequence focuses on a street drain as the voice, in cold sing-song, muses that it could be "useful."

The tape sounds like a bad outtake from "Mission Impossible." But it isn't. The Yishun tape was acquired by "American assets" in Afghanistan.

"Singapore's ISD was already onto the JI cell when U.S. forces picked up the video in an Afghan location," Colter tells me.

"But someone in D.C. took credit for the tape as leading to December 2001's mass round-up of jihadis?" I ask.

"ISD has a legitimate gripe," Colter replies.

And, the last highlight, Bay's encounter with a Gurkha Guard:

As I leave the embassy, a guard with a smile to put a cheshire cat to shame watches, his submachine gun professionally slung.

"What unit are you in?" I ask.

"Gurkha Contingent." Translation: He's a mercenary working special security duties for Singapore.

"The bus stop across the street. I saw a video shot by terrorists from that spot."

"Not now," he replies. No cockiness, lots of confidence.

"That's an MP-5," I say, pointing to his weapon.

"Yes . . . do you know it?"

"When I was in the American Army I had an M-3 .45 caliber sub in my tank. Not as fancy as that MP-5."

"When were you in the Army?"

"Well, I'm still in the reserves."

"Really?" With a quick click he pops me a salute.

I start to tell him I'm here as a writer. But I don't. I salute him, then head down the sidewalk to the street, a stretch of concrete that's as much a front line in this strange world war as Wall Street, or the Pentagon, or a minefield in southern Iraq.

Two years since publication, it still makes for some chilling reading.

Further reading:

- Congressional Research Service Report for the US Congress, "Terrorism in Southeast Asia" (Updated August 13, 2004) (.pdf file)

- Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore, White Paper: "The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and The Threat of Terrorism" (Jan 9, 2003) (here)

- Ministry of Defense, Singapore, "The Fight Against Terror: Singapore's National Security Strategy" (2004) (.pdf file)

UPDATE 2: From Jakarta Post (Feb 24):

MANILA (DPA): Two Indonesians and a Malaysian suspected to be members of the regional Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) group have been arrested in the Philippines, officials said on Thursday.

Police chief Director General Edgar Aglipay said the suspects were arrested in the southern port city of Zamboanga along with a member of the Abu Sayyaf rebel group.

Bomb components, some US$7,000 and assorted firearms were seized from the JI militants, who were allegedly plotting bomb attacks in key cities in the Philippines.

Possible military procurement scandal in Singapore

From ST (Feb 23), "Consultant accused of offering $500,000 bribe", by Selina Lum, with additional reporting by Natalie Soh:

A BUSINESS consultant was charged yesterday with offering $500,000 to a senior executive at the Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) in exchange for information on a major defence deal...

The DSTA, as the procurement agency for this defence contract, would have been responsible for calling the tender for the Defence Ministry (Mindef) project. EADS is the parent of Eurocopter, one of three companies in the running for the naval helicopter project. When contacted yesterday, a spokesman for Eurocopter said it had no comment.

Until a court verdict is out, let's not be too quick to assume that the plantiff is guilty. In any case, EADS did not win the helicopter contract--Sikorsky did. But making a mental note to track this story.

While we are on the issue of military procurement scandals, the above incident, even if true, is no where near the level of the big boys, e.g., the scandals over Taiwan's purchase of her Kang-Ding frigates from DCN, France (the very same people that built the Formidable Frigates for Singapore), involving possibly some 0.8 billion euros worth of bribes, and commissions and "at least eight people who knew about the affair have died in suspicious circumstances" (BBC, Dec 3, 2003)--now that's scandal.

UPDATE: There is a longer news article from AFP (Feb 24; via HK Standard). The disappointing thing is that whether EADS is really guilty, it will be hard for their reputation not to take a beating from the affair. This may mean that their offer of the Eurofighter Typhoon for Singapore's ongoing New Generation Fighter selection may be compromised (the other two contenders are Dassault's Rafale and Boeing's F-15). That's sad because I actually like the Typhoon a lot, though I have to admit that the Rafale looks better.

Do we all need university degrees?

There is an excellent piece on Singapore Ink right now about this issue which is worth a read. Apart from the issues raised there, I think there is another problem that is not mentioned.

Too often, a college/university degree engenders a sense of entitlement (and worse still, the airs that go with that), that somehow, society (or even the world) owes it to me, who now has a B.A. behind my name, to give me a decent non-manual job. This has can have serious social and economic implications.

In a developing country with less supply of jobs requiring such degree holders than there is demand for the jobs, the outcome can be very undesirable. Young people with fancy degrees in the arts and humanities, etc., taking up manual jobs--sometimes ending up in foreign countries--and many of them becoming disaffected, thinking that the world has been unfair to them; or worse still, that they are have the jobs they have only because the richer host countries have prospered at their own countries’ expense. Actually, it’s ofen their own governments that had been myopic in failing to encouraging more of them to be engineers in the first place.

An unpopular opinion, no doubt.

Water in Singapore

Since we are on the subject of water...from CNA (Feb 21):

SINGAPORE - One part of Singapore's Deep Tunnel Sewerage System will be operational by the end of the year. The $7 billion project will be completed by 2015. With that, the 48-kilometre sewer running from Kranji to Changi is finally seeing the light. The North Tunnel will be able to channel more than half of Singapore's used water in 2008.

Waste is now being handled by an extensive network of sewers and over 200 kilometres of pumping mains, stations and treatment plants across the island. At 50 metres underground and 6 metres wide, the new sewerage system will be an expressway carrying used water to Changi Water Reclamation Plant for treatment and conversion into NEWater - in three years. Hence its importance.

From ST (Feb 22), "Have fun with water: It's official--PUB wants the public to enjoy water resources and will open reservoirs to water sports", by Radha Basu (complete article):

AFTER years of being told to conserve and value the country's water resources, Singaporeans are now being urged to enjoy them as well. To help them do so, the Public Utilities Board (PUB), the main custodian of Singapore's water resources, is opening up the reservoirs, traditionally regarded as out-of-bound areas, and encouraging water sports there such as canoeing and sailing. However, not all reservoirs will be open to all types of recreational activities. Details will be announced later.

The authorities' more relaxed attitude comes now Singapore has ensured a diversified and sustainable supply of water. It has four national 'taps' - the local catchment area, imported water from Malaysia, Newater and desalinated water.

* * * * *

A very science inclined friend once told me that much more water than we use fall on Singapore as rainfall every year. After reading the news articles above, I made some calculations. Our land area is about 692 sq km, and our average annual rainfall is about 2360mm. That's something in the region of 1,633,120,000 cubic meters of water per year. The daily comsumption is about 1.2 million cubic metres daily (in 2002), which is about 438,000,000 cubic meters annually. In other words, on average, almost 4 times as much water fall on Singapore as we consume. Now if only we can tap more of this water rather than let them run off. Obviously, this is not an easily thing to do. (UPDATE: wifey just told me that she read something similar before when compiling some readings for GP teaching...so this is not new.)
* * * * *

All this reminds me of something I read in a 2002 IDSS (Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies) Perspectives paper, "On the Singapore-Malaysia Water Issue", by Joey Long Shi Ruey. Some highlights:

Over the years...[PUB] has pursued three broad and rather successful strategies to augment and protect the country's water stocks.

First, the PUB has been involved in the construction of a wide array of reservoirs and stormwater collection depots across Singapore, enabling it to presently collect about 680,000 cubic metres of rainwater daily. This means that with current daily water consumption at some 1.2 million cubic metres, Singapore's catchment capabilities can furnish some 57 percent of its own water needs...

Second, to protect and stretch the use of Singapore's domestic water stocks, the PUB has also pursued a comprehensive water conservation programme. The recipe for conservation comprises four fundamental ingredients: public education to cultivate frugality in water use; incentive-based and pricing mechanisms to encourage water conservation; regulation as well as legislative measures to check growing demand; and consistent improvements in the infrastructure of the water distribution network to minimise wastage through leaks and faulty meters. Such initiatives help to cut down on inefficient water use, check growing water demands and stretch the use of domestic water resources.

Finally, new and improved water purification and filtration technologies have opened up new avenues for the PUB to augment Singapore's domestic water reserves. A prototype recycling plant, capable of producing 10,000 cubic metres of recycled water daily, has been built in 2000, with more on the way. By 2010, such plants would eventually meet 15 to 20 percent of Singapore's water needs.

Desalinated water will also be available. By 2005, some 136,000 cubic metres of desalinated water will be produced daily, with options to construct more desalination plants. Once considered prohibitive, the cost of desalinating seawater has become more affordable. While purifying seawater cost about US$1.80 per cubic metre in 1997/1998, this had fallen to about US$0.70 by 2001. As desalination technology advances, the cost may fall further. This may eventually make desalination as attractive an alternative water source as recycling, which is currently 50 to 60 percent cheaper than purifying seawater.

As might be imagined, such developments poses implications for Singapore's bilateral relationship with Malaysia:

The cumulative effects of Singapore's reservoir construction efforts, the continued enhancement of its water catchment capabilities, the implementation of effective conservation policies and its decision to embark on the building of desalination and recycling plants indicate that Singapore's water vulnerability has been markedly diminished. With the water consumption rate reaching a steady state as a result of a slowdown in population growth, the impact of the PUB's conservation measures and the increasing use of industrial and recycled rather than potable water by its industries, Singapore may be able yet to adequately meet its own water needs.

As Singapore continues to add new sources of water to its already formidable inventory of domestic reserves, there is little reason to perpetuate the securitisation of the water issue in terms of threats and conflict. On the contrary, with greater understanding that Singapore stands on the brink of achieving a measure of self sufficiency and can remain impervious to any Malaysian attempt to use the Johor water supply as leverage and that an objective foreign threat to Singapore's water supply no longer exists, it is time to regard the water issue in Singapore-Malaysia relations as desecuritised.

Indeed, the desecuritisation of the water issue widens policy options, facilitates negotiation, contributes to the reduction in the perception of threat and may better bring about a diplomatic resolution of difficulties involving the water issue between Singapore and Malaysia.

Singapore's move toward greater self-reliance can shift future debates of the water issue in Singapore-Malaysia relations from security to pecuniary considerations. For reasons of availability, cost and the promotion of interdependence, Singapore has signalled that it will like to continue to purchase water from Johor, but in smaller volumes than previously and at a price both sides will find reasonable and fair. Singapore has also coupled its price offer with a "package" of deals that includes, inter alia, the offer of alternative plots of real estate to Malaysia in exchange for a strip of Malaysian railway land in Tanjong Pagar, Singapore, all reportedly amounting to some 1.5 billion ringgit.

Malaysia, on the other hand, has reiterated publicly its intention to continue to sell water to Singapore. It also stands to profit from continuing the sale of water to Singapore at a higher negotiated fee.

UPDATE: From ST (Feb 28), "S'pore has enough water to cope with hot spell", by Peh Shing Huei:

SINGAPORE has enough water to ride out the recent dry spell, Environment and Water Resources Minister Yaacob Ibrahim said yesterday.

He added that the Government was monitoring the heatwave closely, had contingency plans in place, and was ready to 'face any circumstances'.

But he declined to provide details of the contingency plans when asked by reporters, lest this spark needless alarm.

He made his remarks during a three-hour walkabout in Queenstown constituency. Speaking during an hour-long dialogue with residents and community leaders, Dr Yaacob said, in response to a question, that Singapore's water stock level remained 'quite high - way above 90 per cent'.

This was why he was 'very confident' that Singapore's water needs could be met during the hot spell, when daytime temperatures have reached as high as 34 deg C.

In fact, Dr Yaacob said, to laughter from the 250-strong audience, Singaporeans should make sure they drink enough water so as to avoid dehydration.

And, given the national water strategy, which involves drawing from different 'taps' - local catchment areas, imported water from Malaysia, Newater and desalinated water - he is sure Singaporeans will continue to have water in the future.

That is also why Singapore has decided not to renew the water agreement with Malaysia which expires in 2011. A second agreement runs through to 2061.

'I am confident we have enough water to meet the demands of Singaporeans,' he said.

As far as consumption is concerned, he said industries and homes would still have to play their part and not waste water.

Singapore to send desalination plant to the Maldives, also to build school and clinic (UPDATED)

From CNA (Feb 21), "Environment and Water Resources Minister leads delegation to Maldives":

SINGAPORE - Minister for the Environment and Water Resources, Dr Yaacob Ibrahim, will lead a delegation to the Maldives from Tuesday till Thursday. A government statement says the trip is a follow up to Singapore's relief aid to the country in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami and earthquake disaster on December 26 last year.

From ST (Feb 22), "S'pore gives Maldives desalination plant":

IN A move to strengthen ties and bolster reconstruction efforts, Singapore has donated a $600,000 desalination plant to the tsunami-devastated Maldives that will provide clean drinking water to more than 5,000 people. The plant, which the Public Utilities Board (PUB) has been testing in Singapore since April last year, will be placed on the southern Maldivian island of Gan. It will churn out enough water to provide more than 5,000 of Gan's inhabitants with about 50 litres each per day...

The plant can generate close to one million glasses of drinking water a day, using microfiltration and reverse osmosis to remove suspended solids and salt from brackish water and sea water...

Singapore is one of the Maldives' top trading partners, with bilateral trade last year amounting to $315 million.

UPDATE: Almost forgot this earlier story.

UPDATE 2: From ST (Feb 25), "S'pore expands aid offer to the Maldives", by Alexis Hooi:

MALE (MALDIVES) - SINGAPORE is building a second desalination plant, a school and a clinic for the Maldives, in the latest gesture of commitment to tsunami reconstruction efforts for the Indian Ocean republic...

The contributions are part of a $10-million pledge for worldwide tsunami reconstruction efforts that Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong announced recently.

[Environment and Water Resources Minister Yaacob Ibrahim] told [Maldivian President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom] that he was keen to bring in volunteers from Singapore - teachers, doctors - who can stay for three to six months and help with the rebuilding. Said the minister: 'We could even get the school to be adopted by a school in Singapore, so there are closer links at the people-to-people level.'

Maldives Acting Foreign Minister Ahmed Abdulla, said: 'We're very appreciative... and we look forward to working closely with the Singaporean Government.'

Clinics and schools in 50 of the 1,192 Maldivian islands have been destroyed by the Dec 26 killer waves. More than 15,000 Maldivians, or about 5 per cent of the population, lost their homes to the tsunami. Damage is estimated at US$400 million (S$648 million), or 62 per cent of the country's gross domestic product...

'One of the things we can do to... help our Maldivian colleagues is obviously to tell the larger community it's very safe to come to the Maldives, that the tourism industry is alive and developing very well,' Dr Yaacob said.

Final thoughs on the exchange with Redrown

[Navigating this series: 1-3|4|5a|5b|Ref|Final]

Note: This will probably be my final post on this issue (Part 1-3, 4, 5a, 5b, R) for a while, though I may continue to post to the comments. Perhaps Olorin may have other things to add as well.

Redrown has a "Final Summarised Response to Critique" (here) which sheds much light on the context of his posts. The exchange has been illuminating and civil--or should I say, illuminating because civil (contrary to Rushdie's counsel). And above all, I salute his sense of duty: at one point, he reveals that he is PES A and has no intention of downgrading just for the sake of it. I'll salute that any day.

I suspect that at the end of the day, there is a fundamental difference of temperament between us that underlies our differences in opinion. On my remarks about his tripartite account of the types of personalities in NS, he says:

I still maintain that such 'internal questioning' is still considered Type 2, unless one explicitly questioning the reasons during that time, which is tantamount to questioning a superior's command, which is not prudent as it may end one up in serious trouble (which I learnt).

There's something to be said for this. In a way, Redrown was much more "idealistic" while I guess I am much more "conservative" (prudent from one point of view, kia see from another)--I have much less faith in bold attempts to make a difference and would rather go for long, slow incremental changes.

On a different note, I think the discussion can be furthered at a more refined level if we are able to make the analytical distinction between these:

1. The geo-strategic environment of Singapore
2. The military defense requirements of Singapore
3. The role/value/costs of the NS system to Singapore
4. The costs of the NS to an individual Singaporean

They are related, but they are not the same thing. As I see it, we can only begin to have a proper appreciation of 2. if we have some grasp of 1. and 3 only if 2. Note that like Redrown, I do not think that 2. exhausts the field--there are also non military requirements for dealing with the geo-strategic enviroment (diplomacy, etc.). But I believe that at the end of the day, even taking into account all the non-military avenues, there will continue to be a military requirement as well. Once that is settled, we can begin to evaluate the NS system. But what is the metric for assessing the cost/benefit of the NS system? It can't be simply the personal costs to individual Singaporeans, or the social-economic costs in the abstract. Ideally, we should be taking about comparative costs vis-a-vis other alternatives that can fulfill our military defense requirements. Secondly, the comparison is not really that between conscription vs. some other system, but continuing with conscription vs. changing course. Once a policy is in place (for 30+ years too), it imposes additional costs on change that did not exist before. That said, the personal costs are not to be minimised (they add up to significant social cost). In fact, there is surely a lot of scope for making NS leaner and better, less friction, wastage, more bang for the time that individuals have to sacrifice from their life. But addressing those issues is not the same as weighing the cost/benefits of the NS system in toto.

I doubt that the present NS system will see its demise in any forseeable future, mostly because I do not forsee that our geo-strategic situation will allow us to get by with less military capabilities for some time to come. And I do not think that mercenaries are any solution at all, though a larger professional corp would probably be good. That said, a lot can be done and has been done in the area of substituting technology for brute manpower. In fact, I'll venture to say that if anything, this is one of the key strengths of the SAF. The reduction of NSF duty from 2 and a half to 2 years is a good step in that direction. And a lot definitely can be done to make the NSF experience a lot less unpleasant for so many Singaporeans--Redrown highlighted the use of NSF personnel as free labor for NDP, for example, and there's probably also more need for the officers and NCOs to do explain the rationale behind some of the things the SAF does during training, and more Auftragstaktik (see also this) in general (in this regard, the reports from Operation Flying Eagle are promising, and hopefully, they are indications of greater things to come).

Not that I am under any dellusions that the powers that be are monitoring our blogs.

UPDATE: Delighted to see that our exchange with Redrown has made Simon World's Feb 22 edition of "Asia by Blog".

UPDATE 2: ST (Feb 23) published an article, "Total defence lies in public participation", by Dr Azmi Hassan. The writer is associate professor with the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia. The original Malay version of the piece appeared in Berita Harian Malaysia (Feb 19). Coming from a cool-headed Malaysian perspective, it makes for an interesting read.

UPDATE 3 (28 Feb): Acid Flask of Caustic Soda has extended comments on the exchange, which are too long to summarize here.

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The dangers of exaggerated science

Who would have thought that in a fight between scientists and evil-corporations, the scientists would...win. By Hans von Storch and Nico Stehr in Das Spiegel online, translated from the German by Christopher Sultan. Highlight:

This self-censorship in the minds of scientists ultimately leads to a sort of deafness toward new, surprising insights that compete with or even contradict the conventional explanatory models. Science is deteriorating into a repair shop for conventional, politically opportune scientific claims. Not only does science become impotent; it also loses its ability to objectively inform the public.

An example of this phenomenon is the discussion surrounding the so-called hockey stick, a temperature curve that supposedly portrays developments of the last 1,000 years. The curve derives its name from its hockey stick-like shape. In 2001, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, a panel of climate researchers established by the United Nations, rashly institutionalized the hockey stick curve as an iconic symbol of human-induced climate change. In the curve, the upward-tilting blade of the hockey stick that follows decades of stable temperatures represents human influence.

In an article we published in the professional journal "Science" in October 2004, we were able to demonstrate that the underlying methodology that led to this hockey stick curve is flawed. Our intention was to turn back the spiral of exaggerations somewhat, but without calling the core statement into question, which is that human-induced climate change does exist. Prominent members of the climate research community did not respond to the article by engaging us in a dispute over the facts. Instead, they were concerned that the worthy cause of climate protection had been harmed.

Other scientists are succumbing to a form of fanaticism almost reminiscent of the McCarthy era. In their minds, criticism of methodology is nothing but the monstrous product of "conservative think-tanks and misinformation campaigns by the oil and coal lobby," which they believe is their duty to expose. In contrast, dramatization of climate shift is defended as being useful from the standpoint of educating the public.

The principle that drives other branches of science should be equally applicable to climate research: dissent drives continued development, and differences of opinion are not unfortunate matters to be kept within the community. Silencing dissent and uncertainty for the benefit of a politically worthy cause reduces credibility, because the public is more well-informed than generally assumed. In the long term, the supposedly useful dramatizations achieve exactly the opposite of what they are intended to achieve. If this happens, both science and society will have missed an opportunity.

(via Arts and Letters Daily)

Introducing "terse & at large"

Discovered this blog via Mr. Brown--"terse & at large" authored by a "former ad executive, teacher, now photographer" by the name of Terz.

Terz was in Meulaboh (by RSS Endeavour) as part of a Mercy Relief team (of twelve) and the photos can be viewed on his blog (viewer discretion is strongly advised, as some of the photos may be disturbing): His reporting is fascinating and heartbreaking--a rare up-close view into life post-tsunami in Meulaboh. Just one excerpt:

Day 2 Charlie...Somehow, I'm feeling more helpless now than I did while back in Singapore and wondering if there was something more I could do to help. I've documented, I've done carpentry, I've moved mud and dirt, I've made some sort of contact with the people in the neighbourhood. I've tried my best to be an ambassador. Yet, somehow, it feels that I've not done enough.

I was talking to Eddie earlier. He's right: words just aren't enough. There's nothing we can say to let people at home know what we've seen and experienced. At that moment, I remember wanting to go home as quickly as I can and holding my wife for as long as I can and just spending time with my family, friends and loved ones.

Operation Flying Eagle (Part 2)

"Operation Flying Eagle: The inside story of the SAF's tsunami relief deployment, Part 2: Setting up a lifeline to Aceh" (ST, Feb 20) is out, covering operations in Meulaboh (from the arrival of the RSS Endurance), and secondarily, in Banda Aceh and Medan. I blogged on the first part a week ago. Once again, the bulk of the big-picture details have already been covered on this blog at some point or other (like Singapore Ink, I didn't find as much of special interest--of the more controversial sort). But there are some points worth highlighting.

Let's begin with an example of "thinking out of the box":

The priority was to find and prepare a landing point from where the Endurance's fast landing craft could safely unload men and equipment. This was no easy task, especially in an environment that was totally new and alien.

Debris and underwater obstacles were a big headache. Said Naval diver 2WO (Warrant Officer) Wee Kheng Par, a graduate of one of the toughest training in the world, the US Navy Seal course: 'There was a huge amount of debris, such as sunken vessels, which could puncture our landing craft. Together with other divers, I secured the obstacles with heavy chain and rope.'

Obstacles like damaged vehicles and broken concrete pillars were pulled ashore by the Combat Engineers' tractor.

'There was no quick answer that could be found in a manual and many decisions had to be made on the fly,' commented 2WO Wee. 'We had to rely on our experience gained from training and brainstorming on the ground.'

No matter how thorough training may be, the world will continue to be full of surprises. Training is thus effective if it makes possible on the spot improvision. This is an example of military preparation of the sort that is hard to come by in contrived exercises.

If you have been following SAF's tsunami relief operations, you would have known by now just how crucial the RSAF's Chinook helicopters proved. These are the CH-47SD ("Super D") models (in fact, Singapore was the very first customer for these models). The only other countries in the broader region with such helicophers are Thailand, Australia and Taiwan. It is thus not completely surprising to read the following:

The Chinooks of the Republic of Singapore Air Force were the only medium and heavy lift helicopters in Aceh until Jan 15, when the US Marines started flying their CH-46s.

And for Meulaboh specifically,

Said Defence Minister Teo: 'The Chinooks made a difference to the people of Meulaboh as they were able to establish the initial supply lines.'...It was the only heavy-lift helicopter operating in the disaster areas until the arrival of Japanese Chinooks much later. It has a crew of two pilots, two flight engineers and one aircrew specialist.

For something like two weeks, our 6 Chinooks in Indonesia were the only medium lift helicopters operating in the area--no wonder the SAF was able to make an impact to the relief operations disproportionate to its size. This specific incident (I mentioned it here previously) now also makes more sense: the SAF were the only ones with the capabilities to respond to it speedily at that stage:

AT THE SAF relief mission in Banda Aceh, which was the worst hit with over 100,000 killed, things were also hotting up. On Jan 4, a chartered Boeing 737 cargo aircraft reportedly hit a buffalo, which damaged its wheel and left it stranded on the sole runway of Banda Aceh airport. This brought all relief flights into the airport to a halt. This was the official version given by a US navy liaison officer although many didn't believe him, especially when he said that the buffalo had walked away unhurt.

The SAF came to the rescue by dispatching a heavy-lift Chinook helicopter to Medan to carry heavy salvage equipment to haul the 737 off the runway. If not for this equipment, weighing 3.5 tonnes, the airport would have been closed for a couple of days. This would have seriously disrupted the overall relief work. It was unfortunate that news organisations like CNN gave wide publicity to the incident but failed to mention Singapore's role. Not that this bothered the Singaporeans, who preferred to maintain a low profile.

I noticed the lack of coverage as well, but there generally wasn't that much by way of international coverage of the SAF's relief efforts in those early days. And even today, I'll wager that the international public at large does not really know much about the SAF's operations in Aceh (outside of the militarily circles). As the Command Post blog nicely puts it--in a paranthesis too--"Singapore (whose efforts are unsung and amazingly valuable)."

Another bit of SAF contribution that passed under the radar was not mentioned in the news story itself, but in the attached .pdf files (this and this; persumably, the attached charts in the printed edition): the deployment of a MATC (Mobile Air Traffic Control tower) to Banda Aceh. I remember reading an Australian news article going on about how bad the air traffic situation was in Banda Aceh airport (which was not made to handle the large volume of flights). But there was nary a follow up on the SAF's MATC beyond aviation publications.

Not that any of this mattered to the locals:

The local people were so excited when the helicopters came in to land that they would swarm around it. The children loved to play in the helicopters' downwash as it could make them actually float in the air. The Singapore pilots had to take extra care during their landings...

The Chinooks were also assigned to evacuate medical cases. These mercy missions brought much satisfaction to the pilots, who flew three-fold more than their average flying hours over a short span of time. This was indeed intensive flying. Said one of them: 'The casualties we ferried from Meulaboh to Medan could not speak English. But a simple wave from them as they were stretchered out from the Chinook spoke volumes about how grateful they were. This was very heartwarming.'

Another factor which I have highlighted often and early--the close relationship between the SAF and TNI:

Commented Lt-Col Yap: 'The TNI officers were comfortable with our cooperation. Our language capability and our understanding of local culture and the Indonesian system made us quite useful to TNI officers, such as helping them to interact with the foreign forces that were arriving in Banda Aceh.' His connections with the TNI officers helped immensely in understanding each other. Lt-Col Yap, who speaks fluent Bahasa Indonesia, is a graduate of the Indonesian Army Command and College in Bandung.

Some of the senior TNI officers assigned to the area, like the area military commander Lt-Col Djoko, were his and other SAF officers' course mates. 'This is why, shortly after we arrived in Banda Aceh, we were able to work closely with the TNI,' he said. 'They were comfortable with our presence, especially with our low profile and sincere assistance.'

But it wasn't just the ability to speak Bahasa, or the personal ties with TNI officers. More importantly, the SAF was able to play the role of a true friend in a time of need (see also this):

The SAF were effective in their contributions because they knew where the needs were. Some foreign medical teams deployed to places where there were no people to treat, although they brought along the full complement of medical equipment. They set up big field hospitals when the need was for primary health care.

As the above pointed out, the same cannot be said of many aid agencies (see e.g., this), though there are outstanding exceptions, most of which pass beneath the radar. But, the way I saw it (and continue to see it): the SAF was able to do all that not because Singaporeans are especially smart; rather, a keen consciousness of the limitations of our resources acts as that great necessity that compels inventiveness. Where it matters, we are quite good at getting the best bang for the buck. It is disappointing (though not surprising), therefore, that in more peaceful conditions, we tend to throw money at problems. Or at least, there is a perception that this is what we often do. (from this earlier post).

And finally, what would we Singaporeans be without some concern for good food?

Although the food served by the 10 chefs of Endurance was palatable, albeit unexceptional, it became a game for the men to spread wild rumours about food. These rumours were invariably sparked off by the steady stream of VIP visitors. The men would strain to see if these visitors brought along any goodies with them. There were rumours of refrigerated containers of mandarin oranges arriving. Another rumour, even more fanciful, was the arrival of a shipment of bak kwa. As it turned out, the rumours were not totally unfounded. The Chief of Engineers did bring with him goodies like canned food and Chinese New Year snacks when he visited his men.