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Continuing from
the previous post, this might be considered the "longer version" of my comments on the fifth and final part of
Redrown's critique of Singapore's National Service system (see also
this and
this). As usual, quotes from his post are in italics. Almost all of his post is quoted here.
- Conscription Part 5/5: Is Attack the best form of Defense:
Even with the number of conscripts in our army, the size of our army is paltry compared to neighbouring countries in the south. Should any nation south of us choose to wage warfare, it will only be a matter of time before the siege succeeds in breaking us down.
The strength and effectiveness of a nation's military is not merely a function of the size of the respective armed forces. Suppose country A has many times less men under arms than country B; nevertheless, country A may be at a decisive advantage in a confrontation between the two. For example, this may be because country B, being many times larger in size, also need many more times the manpower to secure its far flung possessions--it can't just, on a whim, gather a significant portion of its stength together against A without compromising its other security commitments. Or it may be because it has much weaker transportational and logistical capabilities--all the soldiers in the world would be useless unless they can be
moved to where they are useful. And even if country B did managed to get pit a significantly larger number of troops against country A, it may yet be disadvantaged, even decisively so, if A's troops enjoy a significant firepower, intelligence, technology, command and control (so many factors to consider) edge over those of country B. Since country A happens to be an island, we can replace "soldiers", "troops", etc. above with "naval and air assets" and the same conclusion follows.
But so much for generalities, just how would a comparison between the militaries of the real life A, B and C work out. For that, let's turn to the following chart in Tim Huxley's
Defending the Lion City, p. 64 (Thanks to Olorin for scaning the page). In fact, the same data can be easily reconstructed from various separate sources if one is willing to surf the web; (see e.g.,
this) and more updated information is available from the latest issues of
The Military Balance if you have access to a good library.

What the chart says can be put quite simply: Singapore enjoys a significant military advantage over Malaysia
and Indonesia. But the chart is only
indicative, not everything relevant is in it. For example, it does not mention SAF's
overwhelming technological superiority over the MAF and TNI (for the case of the navy, see
this), not merely in terms of weapons, but especially in the areas of C4, ISR (Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance). For example, Singapore's SIGINT (signal intelligence) capabilities are among the most advanced in the world (see
this). These intangibles function as powerful as "force multipliers".
Even the listed figures tell only a partial story. Look at the the figures for combat aircraft for instance: Singapore has just about as many combat aircraft as Malaysia and Indonesia combined. Astounding as that may already be, if only advanced jet fighters are counted (e.g., F-16s, Mig-29s and Su-27s), the picture is even more lopsided in Singapore's favor (source
here):
Singapore
7 F-16A/B
42 F-16C/D
[Another 20 more F-16 C/Ds were recently delivered]
Malaysia
17 Mig-29
8 F-18D
Indonesia
2 Su-27
10 F-16A/B
In other words, not counting the more recently delivered
F-16s, the ratio is roughly 4:2:1 (Singapore : Malaysia : Indonesia), instead of the 1.8:1:1 counting all types of aircraft indiscriminately.
There's more--look at the defense spendings. The following additional data is culled from the
CIA World Fact Book to provide a context for the spending figures (figures in US$):
Singapore
GDP: $109.4 billion (2003 est.)
GDP per capita: $23,700 (2003 est.)
Population: 4,353,893 (July 2004 est.)
Malaysia
GDP: $207.8 billion (2003 est.)
GDP per capita: $9,000 (2003 est.)
Population: 23,522,482 (July 2004 est.)
Indonesia
GDP: $758.8 billion (2003 est.)
GDP per capita: $3,200 (2003 est.)
Population: 238,452,952 (July 2004 est.)
In other words, the respective ratios (Singapore : Malaysia : Indonesia) are [UPDATE: made some corrections in the following--I flipped the Indonesia and Malaysia numbers]
By population-- 1:6:60
By GDP (2003)-- 1:2:8
By GDP per capita (2003)-- 8:3:1
By military expenditure (2000)-- 4:2:1
There is a good reason why Singapore is quite possibly the most heavily defended piece of real estate anywhere in the world--the fact is that we have poured much more money into it than our neighbors ever did--for at least the past 20 years. And we actually have the money to spend (look at the GDP per capita comparison). Furthermore, so much of it is in the hardware and research, rather than NS pay--which everyone would agree is a pittance.
But to come back to Redrown's claim that we will not be able to withstand an attack from, say, Indonesia, because of the relative size of the armed forces. The actual facts tell a very different story. Once we realize this, we can also see Redrown's next claim for the non-sequitur it is:
Of course, the plan is to 'hold the fort' till our 'dearest allies' aid us. Mobilisation of a distant army takes time, and much damage will have been done, including probable near-total decimation of our army and much of our populace, before it can be righted by our 'dearest allies'.
First, there will be no "holding the fort". Even if there was no pre-emptive strike by Singapore, if we were to be attacked or threatened, there will be no holding back the SAF from striking far from our shores, for example, at the adversary's capital itself. Second, this notion of "holding the fort" is completely outdated. That might have been the strategy in the 60s and 70s when a defense guarantee from
Britain still meant something (now
that was a long time ago), but no longer. The SAF fully expects to defend Singapore from regional adversaries should one arise. In any case, the allies are already in our midst--that's the whole point about building
Changi Naval Base so that it can accomodate aircraft carriers.
In a funny sort of way, Redrown is not completely unaware of some of the above facts. This is what he says:
Our army is actually assembled for a primary singular purpose which involves a country north of Singapore which rhymes with 'Truly Asia' (hereby TA), whom which Singapore shares a relationship that can be best described as 'decidedly frosty'. This is due to another anomaly in the developed nation that is Singapore. Unlike most other advanced nations, Singapore ultimately lacks a basic essential resource required for self sustenance. Whatever the historical basis for the anomaly, it is an issue which is still unresolved today. In a completely non foolproof way, a treaty which is by all accounts an exploitative one lying much in favour of Singapore is adhered to by TA, not because they feel that it is ethical to 'honour the contract', nor is it because they are a benevolent nation extending the hand of goodwill, but because of the fear of a reprisal from a military primarily poised to defend(attack) should TA attempt anything funny, such as turning off their taps.
I'll come back to the water issue shortly, but notice that Redrown actually admits in a backhanded sort of way, that the SAF has an edge over the MAF. At the very least, the argument in the last line quote above presupposes that Malaysia must think that the SAF is not to be fool around with. In other words, the argument now becomes: the SAF sucks, but the other militaries suck even more, as opposed to "the SAF sucks" that one is lead to expect from earlier posts. But no, you can't have your cake and eat it too. Either the SAF is effective at what it does, or it is not--that's the only
relevant measure worth considering. Effectiveness must be measured against actual goals and purposes, rather than completely abstract standards that have no bearing on real world considerations. (Otherwise, we could just as well say that Einstein is the dumbest physicist ever, except for all the rest.)
Since this is supposed to be about the SAF and the NS system in particular, I don't want to say too much about the water issue. Redrown appears to have bought the Malaysian line ("a treaty which is by all accounts an exploitative one"), which is, to say the least, controversial. Well, the issues are complex (but
not intractable) and I'll leave it to another day, another post, though I will say just a bit more further down. But let's continue:
So what is the best standard of defence? Instead of thinking on military terms, why not think in terms of social, economic and political policy? Instead of depending on TA for a vital resource, why not be self sustaining? Self sustenance is vital for every nation, and despite our advanced society we are ultimately not self sustaining. Perhaps some of the funds which has made Singapore to an advanced society could be funded for alternative sources of this scarce resource? The stigma attached to NEWATER is perhaps unfounded but certainly one which is largely unacceptable by the masses, so why not turn to desalination? The argument against it is that it is costly, but so is building the Esplanade, the NEL lines, the Circle Lines, etc. We are an island surrounded by water. Perhaps there is more to meets the eye in the reluctance of turning to desalination.
First, what on earth is the connection between the first and the second line, and the first plus second lines, with the third? Is Redrown suggesting that we have any military defense only because of...
water? Now our military strength is presumably vital in ensuring that, should some rogue government come into power in Malaysia, either they will think twice about turning off the tap, or even if they did, we will secure the pipes and make them pay (look for the term "Mersing Line" in Huxley's book). The Malaysians understand this quite well actually. But even if water is not an issue, even if somehow, we have all the drinkable water in the world, does it meant that we have no security concerns that require a strong military? Or that somehow, if water is no longer an issue, conscription need no longer be an intergal part of our defenses? Secondly, Singapore is building desalination plants (see
this and
this), on top of NEWATER and investing in new technology (see
this). With these and other developments, present indications are that the water issue is becoming "
desecuritised". Ah, the wonders of google.
Redrown continues:
And instead of insensitively making jibes about our neighbouring countries, could our leaders perhaps be more tactful when it comes to sensitive issues? Pride brings downfall and it is undoubted that our neighbours are catching up with us economically. Our leaders should take steps to improve diplomatic relations, decreasing the need for military presence. Where there is a lesser threat, one may take lesser steps to counter a threat. In many amicable neighbouring countries (such as US / Canada), there is virtually no military presence. The size of Brunei's military is less than 100k, and they are in the same region as us. Admittedly our demography is considerably different from theirs, but ultimately the point is that it is possible that national security can be achieved in other ways than conscription. In fact, given the state of our conscripts, not to mention the social benefits should conscription be discontinued, perhaps pursuing such methods would better ensure the national security we so desire.
I only know of one cabinet minister who
might plausibly be counted as "insensitively making jibes about our neighbouring countries" (though in his mind, he's merely telling the truth). But seriously, if only the world is as simple as Redrown portrays, if only our strategic vulnerability is merely due to our having been insensitive to our neighbors, unless, of course, one is willing to pour any meaning one desires into "being insensitive". If our security situation were no more demanding that that of Canada vis-a-vis the US (or Luxemborg, to cite another example of Redrown's) then it would have been very different. But, unfortunately, that is not so. As for Brunei, let's turn to the most useful CIA World Fact Book again and note the following figures:
Brunei
Population 365,251 (July 2004 est.)
GDP: $6.5 billion (2002 est.)
GDP per capita: $18,600 (2002 est.)
Military expenditure: $339.5 million (2003)
I'll venture that Brunei's military is way, way, smaller than the "less than 100K" figure Redrown mentioned, but I also say that it is surely not because Brunei's demographics is different from ours (though it is) or that it is enjoys such a cozy relationship with it's one neighbor Malaysia (see
this). There are excellent reasons why Singapore and Brunei enjoys very close military ties--one small country helping another even smaller one (by population) with its defense in exchange for good jungle warfare training grounds.
Such collateral issues may not be instantly recognisable as safeguarding our national security since they are by and large indirect means rather than direct means. But as I have said if we are being conscripted, we must know why we are being conscripted. 'For National Security' would be the popular response, but if one opens his eyes wider he will perhaps realise that there is probably more to it than meets the eye. There are alternate/better means to achieve this aim, but it would take a toll on other resources such as government finance and even government pride.
Short answer: nothing I've read in the 5 posts come even close to convincing me that there are viable alternatives to universal conscription for the purpose of dealing with our security situation. Please note that the costs of alternatives are never simply a matter of "government finance" (what on earth is that except my tax-dollars?). And what has "government pride" to do with all this continues to mystify me. To even to
begin putting forward a viable alternative, one would presumably have to come up with a detailed analysis of Singapore security situation, and consequently, the military components for meeting the security requirements. How many tanks, How many combat aircraft? How many ships, of what types? In particular, how many battalions of infantry and other personnel to man all the equipment and do everything else that sustains a modern military system. Then ask: can something else but universal conscription meet the personnel requirements? Can some sort of
selective conscription work? (What about other side effects--e.g., the rich being more able to dodge a selective draft, etc.?) Can we afford to go all-volunteer and maintain the sufficient levels of personnel? How many personnel can be replaced by investment in technology?
(Some of these are just the kinds of questions that MINDEF worked through on a regular basis. And having worked through the questions, they make the appropriate changes to the force structure. The infantry section has been decreasing in size over the years as more advanced weapons and technology in general meant that what used to take 9 men now only require 7. And just last year, the length of full-time national service has been
cut to two years (from two and a half) because of demographic and technological changes.)
Redrown's critique of conscription in Singapore would have been a lot more cogent if he at least make
some effort in those directions, or at least begin to do so by doing some basic research. Everything begins with an appreciation our strategic situation. And yes, that's a tall order, but surely one can begin by showing a firmer grasp of the
official assessment of this issue. No, it's not just a matter of some elder statesman's pride or water--the world is infinitely more complicated than that. And thanks to the work of Michael Leifer, you don't even need to read the government reports to get at such an assessment. One can now read an independent scholar's expert take (he's been at it for decades) on the issue in his
Singapore's Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability (Routledge, 2000) (
amazon). In fact, one doesn't even have to wait for it to arrive from Amazon--a
digital version is offered as well. (By the way, the author Michael Leifer is not completely uncritical of the PAP, but he cannot be faulted for not doing his homework.)
Sadly, I think that cool-headed analysis is not what this is all about, but something else. This is confirmed by the next bit:
I reiterate that it is very possible that we are truly being exploited as a source of labour, by playing to our nationalistic pride and our the fears for the security of our families and ourselves. The government reaps the benefits of our manpower, for the supposedly 'incidental' purposes of National Day Parade, SAF Day Parade, and various marathons etc. Again, they benefit from these Parades as these parades instills a sense of patriotism (or cynics may say, nationalism) in the average citizen. The presence of the conscripts are the source of manpower required to carry out such a scaled event on a regular basis. So that also answers your question about whether NS instils patriotism in Singaporeans. Yes it does, in a most indirect way. [For those who are unconvinced by the power of such parades, attend one such parade rather than catching it on TV]
(Side note, read about how the Israelis were the ones who gave us our first national day parades
here.) Perhaps Redrown felt exploited in his NS days, having to help with NDP and all that. Perhaps he had some really nasty NCOs lording over him. I can't tell. But he has not made his case for his conclusions. He asks:
While they advantageously reap the toil of our labours, it can be seen that on their part they have hardly lifted a finger. They are indisposed to invest more resources on overcoming the self-sustenance issue. While the Gov has taken some steps towards resolving this issue, you would be inclined to think that as the very issue of 'self sustenance' is one of first-rate importance and given the efficient standards of the gov, something foolproof would have been done by now. Why then is there still so much uncertainty?
Why indeed? Perhaps because some things are not within any Singaporean's control--the national interests of Malaysia, for example. We can surely 'solve' the water issue in a year, but at what price? Or perhaps because Redrown has not done his homework about what exactly is being done about the water issue.
He concludes thus:
It should also be fairly obvious to most who have gone thru or are going thru NS that it is a total load of BS, not quite what most of us expected when we were enlisted. The gov should stop treating its citizens as if they are naive kids to be exploited and manipulated at their will. The least they could do is paint the real picture of the situation and stop the pretentious 'wayang', the single thing that the SAF excels in.
It was not obvious to me, nor was it to Olorin, I'll venture to add. But why wait for big brother to tell us the real picture? There's so much information out there, on the net (I've linked to a few sources just in this post alone), in books published by independent expert observers (Huxley being the most readily available, but there are others). The least that one could do is one's own homework.
* * * * *
Coda: Singapore Commentator has
taken noticed. His own thoughts so far:
As for me, I think that conscription does add value to Singapore’s defence capability. The question is whether it is worth the social and economic costs. Unfortunately, I have not seen anything that answers this question to my satisfaction, either in blogs or anywhere else — not even in the aforementioned posts. And realistically, I probably never will.
He's right: weighing the costs and benefits of the NS system would not be an easy task, least of all for mere bloggers. This blog cannot pretend to have done the issue complete justice. The issue is not just about the social and economic costs of the NS, but the relative costs vis-a-vis relevant alternatives. To add to the complexity, any relevant analysis cannot be just about costs and benefits in the abstract--as if we are founding Singapore from scratch--but predicated on the fact that the present system has been running for 30+ years. We can compare the costs and benefits of doing A or B before actually doing either; but having begun doing A, the comparison becomes that between continuing with A and switching mid-stream to B, a different kettle of fish altogether. My intention, however, is merely to present the issues from hopefully a more informed point of view; and my plea is that critics of the present system do so likewise. We could surely do no worse than that.
* * * * *
UPDATE: Found a 2004 news article by former war correspondent (Indochina, the Soviet-Afghan war) Anthony Paul (published in ST Apr 16, 2004), available
here. His words:
SAF reserve units are more tightly bonded than any I have seen. I know of one Beach Road IT company whose ethnically mixed staff were in the same university sports team and are today the core of their reserve unit.
On the Malaysian reception of Tim Huxley's book in the (tabloid)
Malay Mail (Jan 14, 2003), with a sensational rendition of Huxley's dicussion of what a Singapore-Malaysia confrontation might look like (I did say that it's a tabloid...), with some quotations from Huxley's book. The Malaysian forumers were predictably
not very happy about the whole thing.
* * * * *
NOTE: Corrected for grammar/spelling at various times
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