Confucianism and Liberal Democracy
I was particularly struck by two recent posts on The Void Deck concerning the alleged Confucian character of Singapore, and the comments thereof. And this is an issue that bears more than a passing interest for me.
Now, obviously, the issue is not whether the man on the street in Singapore cares about Confucius--he does as much as the man on the street in the US has heard of John Locke ("Johnny who?"). In fact, whether or not the so called ordinary Singaporean cares about the issue is really quite besides the point--whoever said that the best understanding of the politics of a place must necessarily be one that is shared by the man on the street. I bet that for two thousand years of Imperial history in China, the man on the street--or in this case, the village--doesn't know or care much about Confucius or Mencius, or their many philosophical opponents and successors.
But that doesn't negate the fact that for the longest time, Imperial China was ruled by an elite that was quite self-avowedly "Confucian" in outlook, nor the fact that broadly "Confucian" type ideas inflitrated deeply into ordinary beliefs and widely shared values and ideals concerning filial piety, obedience to authority, respect for book learning, etc. The man in the village may not be able (nor would he care to) cite the Analects or the Mencius; but he can still be counted on to respect his elders and take his filial responsibilities to his parents very seriously.
That said, it is an entirely open question whether, one, the Chinese segment of Singapore society is broadly "Confucian" in its native beliefs and values; and two, whether the political structures are influenced by "Confucian" type ideas. And despite whatever the proponents of "Asian Values" and "Confucian Values" might say, the answer is hardly an obvious "yes" to either question.
In Imperial China, if a member of the elite cites Confucian ideas in discussion (by chapter and verse, no doubt), he is often counting upon a widely shared belief among his fellow elites that here are the notions of a sage, the values that we share, the stock of ideas by reference to which we justify our value claims and policy opinions to one another. When a modern Singapore policy maker claims that "this is the Confucian Way" (or sometimes, "this is our Asian heritage"), the putative audience is not necessarily his peers, or even the ordinary man in the street--at least, not directly. (If we can know that "Confucius, he says..." cuts no ice with most young Singaporean Chinese, would our policy makers not know that as well?)
The audience is the opinion leaders of the world, especially of the Liberal Democratic West. The implicit message is a simple one too: "You have your John Locke and Immanuel Kant and stuff, we have our Confucian tradition; are your ideas necessarily better than ours? Why then are you breathing down our neck on individual rights and other Western concerns?"
Singapore's material prosperity is evident for all to see. The question is whether its departures from a more liberal democratic model can be grounded not merely in the mere fact of material success (which, being merely factual, is also in that sense vulgar), but at the level of ideas, whether what is the case has a foundation in what ought to be the case. The very existence of a Confucian Values discourse testifies to the fact that the defenders of the Singapore Model has deeper ideological ambitions beyond the mere pragmatism and the citation of our material success.
And it remains an open question whether and to what extent the ideological ambitions of the Singapore Model can succeed--at the level of ideas--and what exactly are the consequences of its success or failure. But one thing is certain: for those who care about ideas (and if you don't, you must be very bored to be snooping around here), these issues cannot be resolved without a deeper understanding of the philosophical foundations of both liberal democracy and the Confucian tradition--not the stuff purveyed by self-serving activists or politicians on either side. Saying that the man on the street does not know or care about something is not the same as saying that he has no reason to.
* * * * *
Some good books in the general area of interest that I've found useful in thinking about some of these issues:
- Chua Beng Huat's Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore is still very much a must read for its attempt to get theoretically clear about "the attempt to develop a particular form of anti-liberal democratic polity by a highly ideologically conscious political elite". The book has a chapter overviewing the rise and fall of the "Asian/Confucian Values" disourse in Singapore the 80s, which makes for excellent background material.
- Daniel Bell's East Meets West (e-version available as well) is an interesting one--the whole thing is a series of fictional dialogues between a human rights activist with, first, a democracy worker from Hong Kong, then Lee Kuan Yew (sic), then a political scientist from China. Bell taught for a few years in NUS before (se he does know a thing or two about this place--which is more than what many critics of Singapore can claim), then eventually Hong Kong and Tsinhua. A communitarian (and therefore a critic of liberalism), he takes the Confucian challenge to liberal democracy very seriously--the last time I saw him, he was giving a paper about how Confucian ideas might be used to resolve some of the issue relating to foreign domestic workers in Hong Kong.
- Theodore De Bary's The Trouble with Confucianism is actually from the 1988 Tanner Lectures at UC Berkeley. By "Trouble", he meant the "different kinds of trouble Confucianism either fell into, made for itself, or created for others"--and it is easy to forget that Confucianism is a critical tradition that cause as much trouble for authoritarian rule as it was supposed to be an asset. The .pdf file for the lecture itself is available here (I think the book has slightly more stuff), so you might not even have to buy the book.
Now, obviously, the issue is not whether the man on the street in Singapore cares about Confucius--he does as much as the man on the street in the US has heard of John Locke ("Johnny who?"). In fact, whether or not the so called ordinary Singaporean cares about the issue is really quite besides the point--whoever said that the best understanding of the politics of a place must necessarily be one that is shared by the man on the street. I bet that for two thousand years of Imperial history in China, the man on the street--or in this case, the village--doesn't know or care much about Confucius or Mencius, or their many philosophical opponents and successors.
But that doesn't negate the fact that for the longest time, Imperial China was ruled by an elite that was quite self-avowedly "Confucian" in outlook, nor the fact that broadly "Confucian" type ideas inflitrated deeply into ordinary beliefs and widely shared values and ideals concerning filial piety, obedience to authority, respect for book learning, etc. The man in the village may not be able (nor would he care to) cite the Analects or the Mencius; but he can still be counted on to respect his elders and take his filial responsibilities to his parents very seriously.
That said, it is an entirely open question whether, one, the Chinese segment of Singapore society is broadly "Confucian" in its native beliefs and values; and two, whether the political structures are influenced by "Confucian" type ideas. And despite whatever the proponents of "Asian Values" and "Confucian Values" might say, the answer is hardly an obvious "yes" to either question.
In Imperial China, if a member of the elite cites Confucian ideas in discussion (by chapter and verse, no doubt), he is often counting upon a widely shared belief among his fellow elites that here are the notions of a sage, the values that we share, the stock of ideas by reference to which we justify our value claims and policy opinions to one another. When a modern Singapore policy maker claims that "this is the Confucian Way" (or sometimes, "this is our Asian heritage"), the putative audience is not necessarily his peers, or even the ordinary man in the street--at least, not directly. (If we can know that "Confucius, he says..." cuts no ice with most young Singaporean Chinese, would our policy makers not know that as well?)
The audience is the opinion leaders of the world, especially of the Liberal Democratic West. The implicit message is a simple one too: "You have your John Locke and Immanuel Kant and stuff, we have our Confucian tradition; are your ideas necessarily better than ours? Why then are you breathing down our neck on individual rights and other Western concerns?"
Singapore's material prosperity is evident for all to see. The question is whether its departures from a more liberal democratic model can be grounded not merely in the mere fact of material success (which, being merely factual, is also in that sense vulgar), but at the level of ideas, whether what is the case has a foundation in what ought to be the case. The very existence of a Confucian Values discourse testifies to the fact that the defenders of the Singapore Model has deeper ideological ambitions beyond the mere pragmatism and the citation of our material success.
And it remains an open question whether and to what extent the ideological ambitions of the Singapore Model can succeed--at the level of ideas--and what exactly are the consequences of its success or failure. But one thing is certain: for those who care about ideas (and if you don't, you must be very bored to be snooping around here), these issues cannot be resolved without a deeper understanding of the philosophical foundations of both liberal democracy and the Confucian tradition--not the stuff purveyed by self-serving activists or politicians on either side. Saying that the man on the street does not know or care about something is not the same as saying that he has no reason to.
* * * * *
Some good books in the general area of interest that I've found useful in thinking about some of these issues:
- Chua Beng Huat's Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore is still very much a must read for its attempt to get theoretically clear about "the attempt to develop a particular form of anti-liberal democratic polity by a highly ideologically conscious political elite". The book has a chapter overviewing the rise and fall of the "Asian/Confucian Values" disourse in Singapore the 80s, which makes for excellent background material.
- Daniel Bell's East Meets West (e-version available as well) is an interesting one--the whole thing is a series of fictional dialogues between a human rights activist with, first, a democracy worker from Hong Kong, then Lee Kuan Yew (sic), then a political scientist from China. Bell taught for a few years in NUS before (se he does know a thing or two about this place--which is more than what many critics of Singapore can claim), then eventually Hong Kong and Tsinhua. A communitarian (and therefore a critic of liberalism), he takes the Confucian challenge to liberal democracy very seriously--the last time I saw him, he was giving a paper about how Confucian ideas might be used to resolve some of the issue relating to foreign domestic workers in Hong Kong.
- Theodore De Bary's The Trouble with Confucianism is actually from the 1988 Tanner Lectures at UC Berkeley. By "Trouble", he meant the "different kinds of trouble Confucianism either fell into, made for itself, or created for others"--and it is easy to forget that Confucianism is a critical tradition that cause as much trouble for authoritarian rule as it was supposed to be an asset. The .pdf file for the lecture itself is available here (I think the book has slightly more stuff), so you might not even have to buy the book.
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